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Executive Summary 
PKI is often referred to as a pervasive substrate. This terminology is used to describe 
the technological layer that permeates the entirety of the organisation on which PKI 
services are established. From the mid 1970s when Whitfield Diffie and Martin 
Hellman published their paper New Directions in Cryptography the concept of Public 
Key Cryptography, for the first time, allowed two entities with no previous 
relationship to communicate secure information over unsecured channels. PKI 
provides the infrastructure that allows Public Key Cryptography to function within a 
hierarchical structure, providing between two entities, an acceptable level of trust.  
 
Outsourcing is the process of acquiring sources or services from an external source. 
With the modular structure of today’s organisations it can also mean that goods and 
services can be procured from one segment of the organisation to another through in-
house service-supplier agreements. Outsourcing has evolved from the days of heavy 
industry and manufacturing in the 1960s to the total solution management of today.  
 
This dissertation brings together the concepts of both PKI and Outsourcing. It details 
our AB-5C Model for organisations to outsource a PKI system within the scope of the 
businesses strategic goals and objectives. Our proposed model takes into account the 
need to use existing models, procedures and practices in support of an outsourced PKI 
Model. These include a process or processes to ensure that any outsourced solution 
adds value to the organisation, and that there is a business strategy that allows the 
alignment of the outsourcing strategy to the organisations strategic plan.  
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Motivation 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is a business enabler. With the advent of a network 
centric society organisation’s have to meet the threats, challenges and opportunities 
that lie ahead. PKI can provide the services that enable business and meet the 
demands of the 21st Century. The technology is available but security professionals 
that have both the technical and business skills are in short supply. I aim to learn 
about the issues involved in both the business and technical aspects of outsourcing 
PKI as the next rung on the ladder of my future career.  
 
PKI is an expansive subject providing the core services of Confidentiality, Integrity, 
Authentication and Authorization. By studying PKI outsourcing I aim to consolidate 
my technical knowledge gained on the core and elective modules. I also aim to bring 
in the non-technical aspects of the course by looking at the Business and Management 
(both Security and Risk Management), legal aspects as well as standards and 
regulatory bodies that are involved with PKI. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xii
 
 
Glossary of Terms 
A  
ABA American Bar Association  
AC Attribute Certificate  
ANSI American National Standards Institute 
API Application Programming Interface 
  
C  
CA Certification Authority  
CARL Certification Authority Revocation Lists 
CESG Communication Electronics Security Group 
CMP Certificate Management Protocol 
CMS Cryptographic Message Syntax 
CP Certificate Policies  
CPS Certificate Practice Statement 
CRL Certificate Revocation List  
CRMF Certificate Request Message Format 
CRT Certification Revocation Tree 
CSP Certification Service Provider 
  
D  
DN  Distinguished Name 
DNS Domain Name System 
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm  
DSA Directory Service Agent 
  
E  
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level 
EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol 
EEMA European Association for e-identity and Security  
 xiii
EPRL End Entity Public Key Certificate Revocation List 
  
F  
FIPS  Federal Information Processing Standards 
FTP File Transfer Protocol 
  
G  
GCHQ Government Communications Headquarters 
GSS Generic Security Service 
  
H  
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol over SSL 
  
I  
ICV Integrity Check Value 
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers 
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force 
IKE  Internet Key Exchange  
IPRA Internet Policy Registration Authority 
IPSEC Internet Protocol Security  
ISMS Information Security Management System 
ISO International Standards Organisation  
ITIL IT Infrastructure Library 
ITSEC Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria 
ITU-T International Telecommunications Union – Telecommunication 
  
K  
KDC Key Distribution Centre 
KEA Key Exchange Algorithm  
KTC Key Translation Centre 
  
L  
 xiv
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol 
LAN Local Area Network 
M  
MAC Message Authentication Code 
MIC Message Integrity Check 
MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
MSCHAPv2 Microsoft Challenge-Handshake Authentication Protocol 
  
N  
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology 
  
O  
OASIS Organisation for the Advancement of Structured Information 
Standards  
OCSP Online Certificate Status Protocol 
OID Object Identifier 
  
P  
PCA Policy Certification Authorities 
PDCA Plan, Do, Check, Act  
PEAP Protected Extensible Authentication Protocol 
PEM Privacy Enhancement for internet electronic Mail 
PGP Pretty Good Privacy 
PKC Public Key Cryptography 
PKCS  Public key Cryptographic Standard 
PKI Public key Infrastructure 
PKIX Public Key Infrastructure (X.509) 
PP Protection Profile 
PPP Point to Point Protocol 
  
R  
RA Registration Authority 
RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial in User Service 
 xv
RFC Request for Comments 
ROI  Return on Investment 
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman 
  
S  
S/MIME Secure Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions  
SABSA Sherwood Applied Business Security Architecture 
SAML Security Assertion Mark-up Language  
SCVP Simple Certificate Validation Protocol 
SET  Secure Electronic Transaction  
SHS Secure Hash Standard 
SIM Subject Identification Method 
SLA Service Level Agreement  
SPKM Simple Public Key GSS-API Mechanism 
SSE-CM System Security Engineering – Capability Model 
SSL  Secure Socket Layer  
ST Security Target 
  
T  
TCP Transmission Control Protocol 
TCSEC Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria 
TLS Transport Layer Security  
TOE Target of Evaluation 
TSA Time-stamping Authority  
TSP Time-stamping Protocol 
  
U  
URL Uniform Resource Locator 
  
V  
VPN  Virtual Private Network  
  
W  
 xvi
WAN Wide Area Network 
WAP Wireless Application Protocol 
WLAN Wireless LAN 
WTLS Wireless Transport Layer Security 
  
X  
XML Extensible Mark-up Language  
 
 1
1. Introduction 
This dissertation will take the following structure:  
 
• Chapter 1 will provide the reader with the necessary information to understand 
why outsourcing PKI was chosen by the author as the subject of the 
dissertation. 
• Chapter 2 defines the basic principles of PKI and aims to give the reader a 
level of understanding of the technologies and principles that are common to 
PKI. 
• Chapter 3 defines the basic principles of outsourcing, ranging from the history, 
reasons for outsourcing, advantages and disadvantages and details the concept 
of multi-sourcing that has recently emerged. 
• Chapter 4 is our own AB-5C Model for Outsourcing PKI. This brings together 
various existing models in support of the final model.  
• Chapter 5 summarizes the work completed in the dissertation and provides 
details of how the original outcomes have been met, a critique of the work 
carried out and a brief description of further work leading from this 
dissertation.  
1.1. Introduction 
PKI and Outsourcing are phenomena that gained widespread industry exposure in the 
1990s. Both were regarded equally by pundits as a method in which organisations 
could cut cost and utilise new technologies to gain business advantage. Whilst 
outsourcing took off, PKI failed to make an impact on organisations due to the cost of 
setting up the system and the requirement for skilled staff, which at the time were few 
and far between.  
 
The failure of PKI can be shown by the demise of  Baltimore Technologies from a 
company valued at £7 billion at the height of the dotcom boom, to a company with 
only £25 million in cash in 2003.[1] At a share meeting in Dublin, Baltimore’s PKI 
technology was sold to beTrusted a PWC subsidiary, with its core software security 
business sold to UniCert. The downfall of Baltimore Technologies was not entirely of 
its own making but the failure of PKI to take off. This was due to the difficulty and 
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cost of implementing PKI and the lack of requirement from businesses of such an 
expensive overhead.   
 
It now seems that outsourcing in many industries is falling out of favour as complaints 
about poor service circulate. Many UK Banks, and Building Societies, and Service 
Providers advertise that they are bringing some of their outsourced activities back into 
the organisation. PKI on the other hand looks like it has been shown to have solid 
business applications and cost benefits. According to the European Association for e-
identity and Security (EEMA) at their EEMA UK Regional Interest Group meeting 
titled Management and Application of PKI in Corporate Environments,  a consensus 
was reached by the twenty-six delegates that:  
 
“The fact that the benefits of strong PKI across many business applications 
outweigh the cost of the PKI infrastructure management; and that PKI is not 
just about securing things, it is also an enabler for new, cost-effective, 
efficient, business processes which were hitherto not feasible because of 
security risks, legislation etc”[2]  
 
This view is supported by Stijn Bijnens, Senior VP Identity Management, CEO 
Ubizen. In a presentation to the Leuven Security Excellence Consortium, IT Security 
Congress,[3] Bijnens discussed the implementation problems of PKI during the 
dotcom boom. He also discussed the resurgence of PKI due to the renewal of interest 
by Governments keen to pursue ID card schemes, whilst at the same time, applying 
pressure to commercial organisations to meet compliance requirements.  
 
PKI still has its opponents and one of the most outspoken is Bruce Schneier. In a 
paper co-written with Carl Ellison, titled, “Ten Risks of PKI: What you’re not being 
told about Public Key Infrastructure.”[4] Schneier and Ellison discuss organisation’s 
failure to understand the risks associated with PKI, and accuse computer security 
industry of “the year of the …..” syndrome. It emphasises that year on year a new 
technology or product emerges that is hailed as the new fix for an organisations woes 
and argues that PKI is one such technology. The paper refutes the argument that PKI 
is required in order for e-commerce to flourish, when, in reality the e-commerce 
market without PKI was valued at $8.5 Trillion in 2005.[5] 
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PKI will always have its supporters as well as its critics. Today PKI is more widely 
accepted within business, it is now seen as an affordable and beneficial business 
enabler for organisations. As the understanding of the technology improves and the 
concerns of people such as Bruce Schneier are addressed it is our opinion that the 
adoption of PKI will surely grow and evolve.  
1.2. Background  
Historically PKI has been seen as a technical solution in search of a problem to solve, 
but as the understanding of PKI’s advantages and limitations were uncovered it was 
seen more as a business solution and a tool in the strategic arsenal of an organisation, 
not just a technology solution that is available and therefore must be implemented. In 
1999 David Lacey, at the time Director of Security and Risk Management at the 
Royal Mail, was quoted as saying that:  
 
“The Golden Age of PKI was always going to be 2004-07, unifying companies 
to use connected, and regulated certificate authorities will be one way to 
propel PKI forward, while another will be the use of smartcards to make 
things more manageable.”[6]  
 
Since 1995 Gartner has produced and used Hype Cycles to demonstrate graphically 
the maturity, adoption and business applications of specific technologies (See 
Fig.1).[7]  
 
This representation has five distinct phases and can be used to show the approximate 
journey of PKI since it is a term that has been around since the mid 1990’s the actual 
technology goes back to 1976 when Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman published 
the paper “New Directions in Cryptography.”[8] The five phases of Gartner’s Hype 
Cycle are:[9]   
 
• The Technology Trigger 
•  The Peak of Inflated Expectations 
•  The Trough of Disillusionment  
• The Slope of Enlightenment   
• The Plateau of Productivity  
 4
  
 
Figure 1: Gartner's Hype Cycle 
 
If we map PKI and its progression to Gartner’s Hype Cycle then the technology 
trigger was the Diffie-Hellman paper written in 1976. It is now known that Clifford 
Cocks of the UK Government’s Communications-Electronic Security Group (CESG) 
recorded a formula for non-secret encryption in 1973 in a report titled “A Note on 
Non-Secret Encryption.[10] This of course was kept secret by the Government of the 
United Kingdom and cannot be taken as the technology trigger.  
 
The peak of expected Inflation is when there is a widespread over expectation of what 
the technology can do i.e. it can have limited successes in the implementation of the 
technology but also many failures. David Lacey’s comments about the golden age of 
PKI fall into this phase of the cycle. The trough of disillusionment is where the 
technology fails to meet the expectations and is abandoned by the mainstream, or this 
occurred with PKI because of the cost of the implementation of the technology, lack 
of skilled staff and lack of management understanding led to abandonment of PKI 
projects.  
 
The slope of enlightenment is the phase where the technology is not used by the 
mainstream, though some organisations continue to use it in a more experimental way 
until it supports the business requirements of the organisation. This phase has been 
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prominent in the last few years where PKI has been used successfully though 
implementations but has still retained some problems associated with deployment.  
 
The final phase of the cycle is the plateau of productivity whereby the benefits of the 
technology are firmly shown and accepted by the mainstream, the technology 
becomes more stable and implementation becomes easier, in the case of PKI this is 
shown by the comments of the EEMA UK Regional Interest Group and Stijn Bijnens. 
(Section1.1) 
1.3. Statement of Objectives 
The objectives I will achieve through this dissertation are to introduce the principles 
behind PKI and outsourcing. This will give the reader an insight into the history, 
technology and methodology that lies behind the infrastructure. It will be aimed at a 
high level audience and will remain at a technical level that a broad audience will be 
able to understand.  
 
The introduction into the principles of outsourcing will be a management level 
overview of what outsourcing is, which organisations need to outsource and why it is 
beneficial for an organisation to outsource part of or the whole infrastructure. This 
chapter will also cover the managerial aspects of outsourcing PKI including Service 
Level Agreements (SLAs), trust in Trusted Third Parties (TTPs) and strategic 
planning behind the decisions to outsource a PKI solution.  
1.4. Methods Employed to Achieve Objectives 
The methods employed to achieve the stated objects will be the use of standard bodies 
including the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). The International Organisation 
for Standardization/International Electro-technical Committee (ISO/IEC). The 
American National Standards Institute (ANSI), and the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronic Engineers (IEEE), as well as de-facto standards from RSAs Public Key 
Cryptography Standards (PKCS) range. I will use a wide range of books, lecture notes 
from modules undertaken during both terms of study, research & white papers and 
vendor websites. A more complete list of resources that I intend to use to achieve the 
stated objectives is listed in Appendix A: Project Description Form.  
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1.5. Summary 
In this section I have aimed to give a brief introduction and skeletal overview of PKI 
and Outsourcing to give the reader a brief understanding of the concepts that will be 
discussed in this dissertation. As additional background information I have mapped 
the rise of PKI through Gartner’s “Hype Cycle” although this is a basic comparison it 
gives the reader some perspective of PKI and gives some sense of technological 
developments as seen by the mainstream organisations. I have explained in this 
section what my objectives with this dissertation are and how I will meet my 
objectives, the purpose of this will allow me to set out a format that any reader of this 
dissertation will be able to follow and understand the validity of any conclusions I 
make from the material I have researched. 
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2. Basic Principles of PKI 
This chapter will give the reader a level of understanding of the technologies and 
principles that are common in PKI. The chapter starts with detailing the cryptographic 
principles that provide PKI core services of Confidentiality, Integrity and 
Authentication. The reader is taken through the history of PKI, the fundamental 
concepts behind PKI and a full description of a basic PKI infrastructure as defined in 
RFC 3280.  There are descriptions of the services and applications enabled by PKI 
including: 
 
• Server Identification, Authentication and Authorization 
• E-mail Security Services 
• IPSec and VPNs 
• Wireless Network Security 
• Services Provided by TTPs 
 
The description of key management and models for key distribution have been 
added, this will allow the reader to understand the importance of correct key 
management and key distribution within a PKI. One of the fundamental threats to 
any cryptosystem is to attack the key management. So a strong understanding of this 
topic is advised for anyone designing or implementing a PKI.  
 
There is a detailed description of certificates concentrating on the X.509v3 certificate, 
certificate policies, certificate policy statements and certificate revocation including 
both OCSP and CRLs. Digital signatures are described, allowing the reader to 
understand not only certificates and certification but also the types of digital 
signatures that are used and how they are created. The final sections of this chapter 
deal with legal and regulatory aspects of PKI. This is an overview of E-Signature 
legislation and directives. It is important for the reader to understand the basic legal 
concepts in relation to PKI such as the legality of digital signatures and the liability 
that arises from the use of certificates.  
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2.1. Introduction 
PKI is the basis for a pervasive security infrastructure whose services are 
implemented and delivered using public key techniques. The primary goal of a 
security infrastructure is to function as an application enabler providing end-user 
transparency and comprehensive security. The benefits of having a pervasive security 
infrastructure can include cost savings, interoperability and uniformity of solutions. 
2.2. Public Key Cryptography 
PKI is just another tool in an organisation’s arsenal which can be used as the basis for 
strong information protection for systems and services. It utilises Public Key 
Cryptography (PKC), also known as Asymmetric Cryptography. Each end entity 
maintains a unique cryptographic key pair, the key used for encryption is the public 
key and the key used for decryption is the private key. In the case of digital signatures 
the entity maintains a unique key cryptographic key pair for signing and verification. 
The private key can be seen as the signing key and the verification key as the public 
key, though the two definitions are markedly different and should not be confused.   
 
Both cryptographic keys are mathematically related and dependant on each other. A 
main requirement for the asymmetric algorithm is that while the public key can be 
computed from the private key it is computationally infeasible to compute the private 
key from the public key, this allows the public key to be made publicly available 
although the private key has to be kept secret.  
 
If Alice wants to send a message to Bob over an un-secured channel (Figure 2) she 
will obviously know the message that she wants to send but will also be in possession 
of Bob’s public key. The cipher-text will be the result of the message and Bob’s 
public key processed through the encryption algorithm. For Bob to retrieve the plain-
text Bob processes the cipher-text and his private key through a decryption algorithm 
to recover the plain-text message.  
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Figure 2: Public Key Cryptosystem 
 
If Alice wants to wants to provide proof that she is the sender of the message to Bob 
she will sign the message by computing a digital signature and sending that along 
with the message to Bob, in this case the key pair are known as the signature and 
verification keys. The signature key is equivalent to the private key and the 
verification key is equivalent to the public key.   
  
A digital signature is a cryptographic primitive which is fundamental in providing 
authentication (corroboration of the identity of an entity) and non-repudiation 
(preventing denial of previous commitments or actions) but also authorization 
(conveyance to another entity of official sanction to do or be something). The purpose 
of the digital signature is to provide the means for an entity to bind its identity to a 
piece of information.  
 
Public Key Cryptography has some problems in that an entity does not know who is 
using their public key which can lead to certain types of attack, also, the key 
management requires a functionality trusted TTP. Public Key Cryptography has a 
significantly lower throughput of data than Symmetric Key Cryptography. Depending 
on the mode being used keys may not need to be changed too often, though the digital 
signatures mechanism for Public Key Cryptography is relatively efficient. 
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2.3. Symmetric Cryptography 
In Symmetric Key Cryptography, also known as Secret Key Cryptography, both 
parties share a key which must remain secret at both ends of the channel. In a 
Symmetric Cryptosystem (Figure 3), when Alice wants to send a message to Bob then 
she uses a key that has been previously agreed with Bob. The shared secret key along 
with the plaintext is put through an encryption algorithm to produce the cipher-text 
which is then sent over an un-secured channel.  
 
When Bob receives the cipher-text he runs this through a decryption algorithm along 
with the shared secret key to recover the plaintext. Although symmetric cryptography 
can be used to send traffic confidentially over an un-secure channel it has various 
other uses such as secure storage on un-secured media as well as the basis for 
authentication protocols. If Alice and Bob want to ensure that they are communicating 
with each other without revealing the secret key to eavesdroppers they can use a 
challenge/response mechanism. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Symmetric Cryptosystem 
 
There are disadvantages with symmetric cryptography, primarily key exchange 
problems. In large networks many pairs of keys have to be managed and this key 
management requires an unconditional trust in Trusted Third Parties (TTPs). This 
trust will have been built, developed and managed through the use of processes, 
procedures and contracts, more details of which can be found in Section 2.16.2 of this 
document. 
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2.4. Cryptographic Algorithms in PKI 
The cryptographic algorithms used in PKI need to be selected carefully so that they 
work together to provide a comprehensive suite of security services. The algorithms 
that are used are selected on their strengths and weaknesses depending on the 
requirements of the system and the objectives of the organisation. Symmetric 
Cryptography algorithms such as DES, 3DES, AES and IDEA which are used to 
provide confidentiality through encipherment mechanisms, these algorithms can also 
be used to provide a degree of data integrity, identification and authentication through 
the use of MACs 
2.4.1. Asymmetric Algorithms 
Asymmetric algorithms are effective for data integrity mechanisms, authentication 
mechanisms and for key distribution. Digital signature algorithms such as RSA or 
Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) provide relatively efficient digital signature 
schemes; the key used for the verification process is normally smaller than that of its 
symmetric cryptography counterpart. With the use of a TTP digital signatures can be 
used to provide a non repudiation service. Algorithms for Key Transport such as RSA 
and Key Agreement algorithms such as Diffie-Hellman can be used to securely 
distribute symmetric keys and by utilizing the TTP it is easier to establish the identity 
of a private key for an end entity. Table 1[11] is a summary of cryptographic primitives 
used in PKI and the services provided. 
 
Mechanism Data 
Integrity 
Confidentiality Identification 
and 
authentication
Non-
Repudiation 
Key 
Distribution 
Encryption No Yes No No No 
MACs Yes No Yes No No 
Symmetric 
Key 
Cryptography Key 
Transport 
No No No No Yes -  requires 
out-of-band 
initialization  
Message 
Digest 
Yes No No No No Secure Hash 
Function 
HMAC Yes No Yes No No 
Digital 
Signatures 
Yes No Yes Yes (With 
TTP) 
No 
Key 
Transport 
No No No No Yes 
Asymmetric 
Cryptography 
Key 
Agreement 
No No Yes No Yes 
 
Table 1: Summary of Cryptographic Mechanisms 
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2.4.2. Secure Hash Functions and HMAC 
Secure Hash Functions and HMACs provide the basis for integrity within a PKI 
system. FIPS 180-2 specifies four secure hash algorithms all of which are designed as 
iterative one-way hash functions that are used to produce a message digest, full details 
are found in Table 2.[12]   
 
Algorithm Message Size 
(Bits) 
Block Size (Bits) Word Size 
(Bits) 
Message Digest 
Size (Bits) 
Security 
(Bits) 
SHA-1 <264 512 32 160 80 
SHA-256 <264 512 32 256 128 
SHA-384 <2128 1024 64 384 192 
SHA-512 <2128 1024 64 512 256 
 
Table 2: Secure Hash Algorithm Properties 
 
Mechanisms that provide integrity and are based on secret keys are called MACs, 
HMACs are MAC mechanisms based on cryptographic hash functions, and HMACs 
can be used in combination with iterative hash functions. The main objectives of 
HMACs are to use without any modification, an available hash function whose code 
is freely available and can perform well in software with the ability to handle keys in 
a simple way.  
2.5. Digital Signatures  
A digital signature is used by the CA to sign a Certificate which binds the identity of 
an individual to a public key. It also acts as a function that when applied to a message 
produces a result which enables the recipient of a message the ability to verity the 
integrity and origin of a message. It has the property that only the messages originator 
can produce a valid signature on a message. Digital signatures can be used to provide 
non-repudiation of message origin, that is, the recipient of the message has the ability 
to ensure that the sender of the message cannot repudiate that the message originated 
from them. In digital signature schemes asymmetric cryptography is employed. The 
private key is used for signing the message and the public key is used by the recipient 
to verify the original signature.  
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2.5.1. Probabilistic and Deterministic Schemes 
A digital signature scheme consists of three operations, these are the generation of 
keys the signing of a message by the originator and the verification of the signature by 
a recipient. There are two types of scheme that are relevant with digital signatures the 
first is deterministic schemes, these are schemes that do not make use of randomly 
generated data and secondly probabilistic schemes, these are schemes the do make use 
of any randomly generated data. There are problems with both types of scheme if a 
deterministic scheme is used to sign the same message twice then the same signature 
will result but if a probabilistic scheme is used to sign the same message twice then 
the resulting signatures will result. Probabilistic schemes are normally more secure 
than deterministic schemes but it can be very difficult to generate truly random bits 
that are required for probabilistic schemes.  
2.5.2. Digital Signatures Schemes   
There are two different types of digital signature Schemes, digital signatures with 
message recovery where all or part of the message is recovered from the signature, 
this scheme is standardised in ISO/IEC 9796. Digital signatures with appendix where 
the message needs to be stored and sent with the signature is standardised in ISO/IEC 
14888 
2.5.3. Digital Signature with Message Recovery  
Digital signatures with message recovery are produced by lengthening the message by 
the addition of redundancy according to a pre agreed formula, the lengthened message 
is then subjected to the signing process. The process of verification reveals the 
message with redundancy which the original message can be recovered from. With 
this signature scheme the message contained in the signature so the message does not 
need to be sent of stored independently of the signature, though this has the drawback 
of only being able to be applied to messages of a certain length. For messages of a 
longer length that cannot be fully recovered from the signature partial message 
recovery can be used, in this case the signature will be used to sign the whole message 
but the verification algorithm will only recover a portion of the message with the 
redundancy calculated as a function of the whole message.  
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2.5.4. Digital Signatures with Appendix 
Digital signature schemes with appendix generally operate in the same way, the 
message that is to be signed is input into a collision free one way hash function, the 
output of the hash function, called a hash code, is subjected to the signing process. 
The signed hash code will be the signature or in other words the appendix to the 
message. The verification process needs to take two inputs, the original message and 
the signature, unlike digital signatures with message recovery the message cannot be 
recovered from the signature in this scheme. In some digital signature with appendix 
schemes use the sent message to compute a new hash code which is used as part of 
the verification algorithm, in this case the old hash code is not explicitly computed but 
it is implicitly compared to the new has code by some form of computation which 
should have a predictable result if the two hash codes are equal.  
2.5.5. Method of Signing a Message 
The method of signing a message is the same regardless of which signature schemes 
are being employed. The sender first has to prepare a message representative and then 
apply a signature transformation to the message. The message representative is a 
publicly known process and is slightly different for the different signature 
mechanisms but in both cases normally requires the use of a private key. Digital 
signatures always add some form of redundancy to a system, the redundancy is 
dependant on the message and the message representative is referred to as having 
redundancy meaning that the message representative depends on the message itself.  
2.5.6. Method of Message Verification 
As with signing of message, verification of messages is normally done in the same 
way for both types of digital signature mechanisms. Message verification works by 
undoing the signature transformation to recover the message representative, the 
recipient checks the redundancy of the message representative which will allow the 
recipient to check whether the signature is correct or not. For digital signatures with 
message recovery the complete message or portion of the message can be recovered 
from the message representative. There are exceptions to this method of message 
verification, the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) dictates that the message 
representative is re-computed and checks are carried out to ensure that certain values 
are correct.  
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2.6. History of PKI 
The history of PKI begins with the 1976 Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman paper 
“New Directions in Cryptography”[13], in this paper two methods are suggested for 
transmitting keying information over an insecure channel whilst still maintaining the 
security of the public key cryptosystem:  
 
“In a public key cryptosystem enciphering and deciphering are governed by 
distinct keys, E and D, such that computing D from E is computationally 
infeasible. The enciphering key E can thus be publicly disclosed without 
compromising the deciphering key D. Each user in the network can, therefore, 
place his enciphering key in a public directory. This enables any user of the 
system to send a message to any other user encipher in such a way that only 
the intended receiver is able to decipher it.”[14]  
 
In 1977 Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman at the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology (MIT) publicly described an algorithm for a public key cryptosystem 
scheme:  
 
“RSA is the most widely used public-key cryptosystem”. It may be used to 
provide both secrecy and digital signatures and its security is based on the 
intractability of the integer factorization problem,”[15]  
 
A definition of the integer factoring problem is “given a positive integer n, find its 
prime factorization; that is, write n = p1e1, p2e2 ….. pkek where pi are pair-wise distinct 
primes and each ei >1.”[16] 
 
In 1978 Loren M. Kohnfelder in his Thesis for his Bachelor of Science at MIT 
entitled “Towards a Practical Key Cryptosystem”[17] Loren deals with RSA (Len 
Adleman was his supervising professor) which had been published the previous year. 
In this paper Loren introduced the concepts of certificates which were “presented to 
reduce the active role of a public authority administering the public keys,”[18] these 
concepts were developed by Loren to simplify the implementation of RSA and to 
overcome some of the related problems.  
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Public Key Cryptography and Certificates from this point developed in parallel. In 
1985 Victor S. Miller and Neal Koblitz independently proposed the use of elliptic 
curves for cryptography. In 1988 X.509 Version 1 Certificates “began an association 
with the X.500 standard and assumed a hierarchical system of certification authorities 
for issuing of certificates.” [19]  
 
In 1993 RSA labs published PKCS #1, the RSA cryptography standard and in the 
same year X.509 Version 2 certificates with two new fields were introduced. From 
1993 to 1998 saw the introduction of FIPS PUB 186 the DSA Federal Standard, ANSI 
X9.30 the DSA Banking Standard, X.509 Version 3 Certificates, the ABA Digital 
Signature Guidelines, the Internet PKI Certificate and CRL Profile (RFC 2459) and 
the Internet PKI Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework (RFC 2527) 
and many more standards that contributed to the evolution of PKI.  
2.7. Fundamental Principles of PKI 
The fundamental principle of PKI is that the public key can be distributed freely 
allowing scalability, though this has to be backed by integrity mechanisms otherwise 
the services enabled by PKI can be undermined. A single mechanism is used to assure 
the user that the public key has integrity and that it has been bound to the claimed 
owner in a trusted manner. This mechanism is the use of public key certificates, 
namely, X509.V3 certificates. Briefly an X509 certificate contains the following data: 
 
• Version 
• Serial number 
• Signature, Issuer 
• Validity 
• Subject  
• Subject Public Key Info 
• Issuer Unique ID 
• Subject unique ID  
• Extensions 
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The Certification Authority and Certificate revocation has been discussed earlier but 
an additional point is that certificates can be revoked either on-line by means of the 
Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) or off-line using Certificate Revocation 
lists (CRLs).  
2.8. Primary Components of PKI 
The primary components of a PKI system include:  
 
• Certification Authority (CA), the authority is trusted by a large segment of the 
user population to provide the function of binding a public key pair to a given 
identity and allows entities with no prior relationship the ability to 
communicate securely.  
• A Certificate Repository which allows the entities to locate certificates issued 
by the CA quickly and efficiently.  
• Certificate Revocation allows for the revocation of certificates that are either 
no longer valid or for the compromise of a private key.  
• Key Backup and Recovery, in a system it is to be expected that users will lose 
the use of their public key for various reasons including lost passwords, 
destruction or replacement of a medium and for organisations the loss of data 
protected by the key would be unacceptable.  
• Cross certification allows for forming relationships between formally 
unrelated PKI stations.  
• Non-repudiation services in providing technical evidence required should the 
repudiation of an action have to be resolved. Finally time stamping, there has 
to be a time source that is trusted and securely conveyed to entities that are 
part of that particular PKI community. 
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2.9. PKI Primary Services 
A PKI is generally considered to provide three primary services:  
 
• Authentication (the assurance that one entity is who he is claimed to be) 
• Integrity (the assurance to an entity that data has not been changed) 
• Confidentiality (assurance to an entity that no one but the authorized entity can 
read a particular piece of data) 
 
In addition to these primary services PKI can enable the following additional services: 
 
• Secure Communication which is the transmission of data from one entity to 
another with one or more of the three primary services. 
• Notarization provides notary certification and validation of data. 
• Privilege management which is a generic term for authorisation, access 
control, rights management etc.  
 
To provide PKI primary services, security mechanisms are required and these include 
digital signatures, Hashes, MACs and ciphers and so on, a full description of security 
mechanisms can be found in ISO/IEC 7498-2. 
2.10. Cryptographic Key and Certificate Management 
Cryptographic key and certificate management are crucial to the success of any PKI. 
There are underlying assumptions regarding a key management and certificate life 
cycle which have to be noted. These are; the end entity management of key and 
certificate life cycle are not practical and the key and certificate life cycle 
management must be as automated as possible. The key and certificate life cycle 
management must be as unobtrusive to the end user. Comprehensive key and 
certificate life cycle management requires the secure operation and cooperation of 
trusted entities such as the Registration Authority (RA), the CA and the client side 
software which interacts with the PKI components.  
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2.11. Basic PKI Infrastructure  
A typical PKI system has the following components as described in IETF RFC 
2459.[20] 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Public Key Infrastructure (RFC 2459) 
 
2.11.1. Certificate Authority (CA) 
“The CA is responsible for generating public key certificates in accordance 
with a defined CPS (Certificate Practice Statement), and such that the 
certificates can be interpreted subject to a defined CP (Certificate Policy).”[21]  
 
The CA in practice is an entity that carries out the management functions of issuance, 
certificate management, authentication, signing and revocation of digital signatures, 
and they are widely standardised within the IETF PKIX RFCs. CAs normally have a 
hierarchical structure but depending on the organisation and requirements there are 
other architectures such as Mesh, Loose Hierarchies, Policy Based Hierarchies and 
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Distributed Trust Architectures. Figure 3[22] shows a Strict Hierarchical Structure for 
CAs 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Strict Hierarchy of CAs Trust Model 
 
 
In a Strict Hierarchical Model all the subordinate entities must trust the Root CA; it is 
done in a way that provides different levels of security, management and ease of 
certificate issuance. The Root CA is the highest level of CA and it produces a self- 
signed root certificate which will act as the foundation for trust of all the other entities 
in the hierarchal model. The Root CA will sign or certify the certificates in the level 
below it for the zero or more levels of intermediate CA. In turn this level will sign or 
certify the certificates for the lower “non-CA end entities” level. Each entity within 
the hierarchy must be issued with a copy of the Root CA Certificate; this process of 
hierarchical distribution is the corner stone of public key installation.  
2.11.2. Registration Authority (RA) 
The Registration Authority (RA) acts in collaboration with the CA. The RA can be 
used to: [23] 
 
• Register new users. 
• Verification of registration information provided by the user. 
• Generation of end entity cryptographic keys. 
• Certificate revocation. 
• Validating that the user posses a valid certificate.  
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There are two methods of providing communication between the CA and the RA 
depending on which level of security is required by the organisation, the first is the 
introduction of a firewall on the private network between the RA and the CA: 
 
“Only the RA Officer with an RA Certificate is able to forward certification 
requests to the CA and wait for the CA to sign the certificate or CRL, this 
method only provides moderate security as there is still the possibility to 
attack the CA through the RA Server.”[24]  
 
The second approach which is the standard approach is to ensure that the CA is stand- 
alone and has no network connections, with certification and CRL requests etc 
transferred from the CA on removable media. This provides the highest level of 
security as long as the physical security of the CA is maintained no remote attacks can 
occur.  
2.11.3. Certificate / CRL Repository / Directory 
Certificate / CRL Repository / Directory are defined in RFC 2459 as:  
 
“A system or collection of distributed systems that store certificates and CRLs 
and serves as a means of distributing these certificates and CRLs to end 
users.”[25] 
 
 A repository is a system that has two main constituent parts, the address protocol and 
the access protocol. The access control protocol is one of the most important 
considerations when designing a PKI system as it will determine the responsibilities 
that are assigned to each of the parties involved i.e. the CA, the Repository and the 
end entity. “Different repository protocols have different attributes”[26] such as: 
 
• Location transparency: This is the ability of a system to hide from the client 
the actions it undertakes in locating the information required, when a client 
searches for information the process should appear seamless. 
• Performance and availability: The requirement from the relying parties to 
access information grows the repository has to have the ability to cope with 
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the demand. If the relying party is unable to retrieve the information then the 
system fails.  
• Anonymous versus authenticated access is the attribute where end entities can 
remain anonymous or can be authenticated.  
 
There are advantages and disadvantages of both methods. It is purely an 
organisational decision, if the end entities are authenticated it means that, within the 
scope of the organisational business model, those entities can be billed for the services 
provided by the repository.  
 
The last attribute which will be discussed is interoperability, as all parties involved in 
the system interact with the repository it is of the up most importance that they are 
able to communicate with one another seamlessly, if they are unable to inter-operate 
then the parties will be unable to exchange information.  
2.11.4. Directories and Directory Access  
Traditionally a typical PKI repository is called a Directory; this is an online database 
of arbitrary information, this information is referred to as a Directory Entry. Each 
entry is associated with an object class; this class defines the attributes which the 
Directory Entry is expected to contain. If a client requires information from the 
directory it is necessary for the client to know where the request has to be sent and the 
attributes they want from that entry. In addition to the entry being associated with an 
object class the entry is also identified by a distinguished name and this is used as the 
subject and issuer names in the certificate.  
 
Depending on the information required the client will request different attributes, 
these attributes are defined in several standards. The preferred access method for 
repository attributes for PKI is the IETF RFC 2587 – PKIX LDAPv2 Schema. 
Although repositories are most commonly based on the X.500 directory the definition 
of a repository can “apply to a database or other form of information storage and 
distribution, such as on-line revocation and status responder.”[27] If this definition of a 
repository is used then there are various technologies that can be encompassed by this 
definition LDAP Servers, X.500 Directory System Agents (DSAs), OCSP 
Responders, Domain Name Servers (DNS), Hypertext Transport Protocol (HTTP) and 
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File Transfer Protocol (FTP) Servers. These access protocols allow the clients to 
access information for the repositories about certificates and certificate revocation on 
demand allowing flexibility and scalability though the most common method remains 
LDAPv2.   
2.11.5. End Entities 
The End Entity is a user of PKI certificates and/or end user system that is the subject 
of a certificate:  
 
“End entities may be human users, or other types of entities to which 
certificates may be issued. In some cases, the entry for the end entity may 
already exist and the PKI-specific information is added to the existing entry. 
In other cases the entities may not exist prior to the issuance of a certificate, in 
which case the entity adding the certificate may also need to create the 
entry.”[28] 
2.11.6. Operational and Management Protocols 
Operational Protocols are required to deliver certificates, CRLs or certificate status 
information to client systems that utilise certificates. There is a requirement for 
various methods of certificate and CRL delivery and distribution including LDAP, 
HTTP, FTP, DNS and X.500 DSAs all of these specifications are defined in the IETF 
PKIX Standards. Management Protocols are needed to support on-line interactions 
between the end user and management entities, for example:  
 
“A management protocol might be used between a CA and a client system with 
which a key pair is associated, or between two CAs which cross certify each 
other.”[29]  
 
There is set of functions for which a management protocol is required these include 
registration, where the end entity makes itself known to the CA either directly or 
through an RA before the CA issues a certificate, and Initialization, which happens 
before the end entity can securely operate and the keying materials are installed and 
where the relationship between cryptographic key pairs has been established with the 
CA.   
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Certification is the process where the CA issues a certificate for the end entities public 
key and then posts the certificate in the repository or returns it to the end entities 
system. Key pair recovery where the end entities private key can be backed up by the 
CA or a dedicated key backup system, if there is a requirement for the end entity to 
recover keying material then a dedicated protocol is required.  
 
Key pair updates is another management protocol where there is a requirement to 
update the key pair regularly and replaced with new keys and corresponding 
certificate. Finally cross certification, where two CAs exchange the information 
required for cross certification, to cross certify one CA issues a certificate to another 
CA which contains a CA signature key used for issuing certificates.  
2.12. PKI Security Services  
There are three core services that PKI provide these services are defined in the 
standard   ISO/IEC 7498-2:1989, Interconnection - Basic Reference Model - Part 2: 
Security Architecture Information processing systems - Open Systems. 
2.12.1. Authentication 
Authentication can be split into two main broad categories the first is entity 
authentication. This is the process whereby one entity is assured of the identity of a 
second entity in a protocol exchange, this is normally achieved through gathering 
corroborative evidence. [30] Entity authentication has to ensure that the identity is 
claimed at a certain point of time, normally through time stamps or Nonce’s. Entity 
authentication is typically required at the start of connections as it can protect against 
masquerade and replay attacks.  
  
The second category is Data Origin Authentication this is the corroboration to an 
entity that the source of the data received is as claimed. [31] This does not provide any 
integrity protection and therefore cannot protect against the duplication or 
modification of the data. Data Origin Authentication protocols if not designed 
correctly can lead to replay and delay attacks, to that end, most data origin 
authentication and data integrity are provided by the same mechanisms.  
•   
 
 25
2.12.2. Data Integrity 
Data Integrity provides protection of active threats to data. It has is the property 
whereby data has not been altered since its time of creation, transmission or storage 
by unauthorized or malicious users.[32]  
 
ISO/IEC 7498-2 defines five types of data integrity service all of these threats are 
designed to address specific types of threats to integrity. The first service is 
connection integrity with recovery, this service gives integrity protection to all the 
data transferred over an active connection and detects any form of modification or 
deletion of any data, if either occurs then the system tries to recover the data normally 
by requesting the data be resent.  
 
The second service is connection integrity without recovery, which is the same as the 
previous service but it has no message recovery. The third service is selective field 
connection integrity; this service provides integrity for selective fields within the data 
stream transmitted over a connection. The fourth service is connectionless Integrity, 
this service provides assurance of the integrity of the data by the recipient and it gives 
the recipient of the data the ability to determine whether the data has been changed or 
not. The final service is selective field connectionless integrity; this service provides 
integrity protection for selective fields within a connectionless data unit.  
2.12.3. Data Confidentiality 
Data confidentiality is the protection of data from unauthorized exposure. 
Confidentiality, secrecy and privacy are synonymous with each other, some of the 
methods to protect the confidentiality of data range from mathematical algorithms to 
“scramble” data to physical security measures.[33]   
 
ISO/IEC 7498-2 defines four types of Data Confidentiality service. The first service is 
connection confidentiality which provides data confidentiality for all data that is 
transmitted over a connection. The second service is connectionless confidentiality 
which provides data confidentiality for a single data unit that is transmitted over a 
connectionless circuit. The third service is selective field confidentiality which 
provides for the data confidentiality of a selective field data unit irrespective of 
whether it is connection orientated or connectionless. Finally, traffic flow 
 26
confidentiality is the protection of information through obscuring the traffic flow from 
analysis. 
2.13. Services and Applications enabled by PKI 
The Security Services of Authentication, Data Integrity and Data Confidentiality are 
offered by PKI, but there are also services that are enabled by having a robust PKI in 
place within the organisation. There are various services available that allow secure 
communications for server identification, authentication and authorization of web 
applications, email security in the form of Secure Multipurpose Internet Mail 
Extensions (S/MIME), authentication for Virtual Private Networks (VPN’s) and 
Internet Protocol Security (IPSEC), wireless network security and secure instant 
messaging.  
2.13.1. Server Identification, Authentication and Authorization 
Server identification, authentication and authorization of web applications can be 
realised by using Secure Socket Layer (SSL) / Transport Layer Security (TLS) and 
Hypertext Transport Protocol over SSL (HTTPS) both of which require certificates to 
provide the stated security services.  
 
“SSL is a protocol that provides secure channel between two machines. It has 
facilities for protecting data in transit and identifying the machine with which 
you are communicating. The secure channel is transparent, which means that 
it passes the data through unchanged. The data is encrypted between client 
and server.”[34]  
 
SSL/TLS protocol is defined in the IETF RFC 2246, “The primary goal of the TLS 
protocol is to provide privacy and data integrity between two communicating 
applications. The protocol is composed of two layers: the TLS Record Protocol and 
the TLS handshake protocol. At the lowest level, layered on top of the reliable 
transport protocol (i.e. TCP), is the TLS Record Protocol. “The TLS Record Protocol 
provides connection security that has two basic properties, that is the connection is 
private and that the connection is reliable.” [35]  
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There are four cryptographic primitives that are attributed to TLS: 
 
• Digital Signatures. 
• Stream Ciphers.  
• Block Ciphers 
• Public Key Cryptography.  
 
A PKI can be put in place to provide the cryptographic requirements of SSL/TLS and 
ensure that the security services that are provided meet the confidentiality, integrity 
and authentication requirements of PKI.  
 
The first application layer protocol to be secured by SSL was HTTPS the first 
implantation of which was in 1995 by Netscape. HTTPS is standardised by the IETF 
in RFC 2616, as the requirement for secure applications using HTTP, SSL/TLS was 
designed to provide channel orientated security and is used in the same way HTTP 
over TCP is used: 
 
“The HTPPS approach is very simple: The client makes a connection to the 
server, negotiates an SSL connection, and then transmits its HTTP data over 
the SSL application data channel.”[36] 
2.13.2. E-mail Security Services 
E-mail security service in PKI can be provided by S/MIME and is standardised by the 
IETF S/MIME working group in a series of RFC’s. SMIME provides a method of 
sending and receiving secure MIME data, it provides the following security 
services:[37] 
 
• Authentication. 
• Message Integrity. 
• Non Repudiation of Origin. (When using digital signatures). 
• Privacy & Data Security using encryption. 
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S/MIME provides the following functions, enveloped data, which is the encrypted 
content of any type encryption keys for one or more end entities. Signed data, a digital 
signature is formed by taking the message digest of the content to be signed and then 
encrypting that with the private key for the signer. The content plus signature are then 
encoded using base64 encoding, signed data message can only be viewed by an end 
entity with an S/MIME capability.  
 
Clear-signed data, as with signed data, a digital signature of the content is formed. 
However in this case, only the digital signature is encoded using base64, end entities 
without S/MIME can view the message but cannot verify the signature. Signed and 
enveloped data, singed-only and encrypted-only entities may be nested, so that 
encrypted data may be signed and signed data or clear-signed data may be encrypted. 
 
Function Requirement 
Create a Message Digest (MD) to be used 
in forming a digital signature 
Must support SHA-1 
 
Receiver Should support MD5 for   
backward compatibility 
Encrypt message digest to from a digital 
signature 
Sending and receiving agents Must  
support DSS 
 
Sending agents Should support RSA       
encryption 
 
Receiving agents Should support 
verification of RSA signatures with key 
sizes 512 bits to 1024 bits 
Encrypt session key for transmission with 
message 
Sending and receiving agents Must 
support Diffie-Hellman 
 
Sending agents Should support RSA 
encryption with key sizes 512 bits to 
1024 bits 
 
Receiving  agent Should support RSA 
decryption 
Encrypt message for transmission with 
one-time session key 
Sending agents Should support 
encryption with 3DES and RC2/40 
 
Receiving agents Must support 
decryption using 3DES and Should 
support decryption with RC2/40 
 
Table 3: S/MIME Cryptographic Algorithms 
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Table 3 lists the cryptographic requirements for S/MIME, the definitions used in the 
table are taken from IETF RFC 2119.[38] 
2.13.3. IPSec and VPNs 
IPSec is the basis for Virtual Private Networks (VPNs): 
 
 “IPSec is designed to provide interoperable, high quality, cryptographically-
based security for IPv4 and IPv6.  The set of security services offered includes 
access control, connectionless integrity, and data origin authentication, 
protection against replays (a form of partial sequence integrity), 
confidentiality (encryption) and limited traffic flow confidentiality.”[39]  
 
IPSec meets it objectives through the use of two security protocols. The first is the 
Authentication Header (AH), this protects the IP header by computing a cryptographic 
checksum and hashing the IP header with a secure hashing algorithm.  The second is 
the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), this protects the packet data by symmetric 
cryptographic algorithms and also through key management protocols.  
 
The protocols and procedures utilised by IPSEC are determined by the security 
requirements of the organisation, systems or users. When the implementation of the 
protocols and procedures are complete it should be such that there is no adverse effect 
on the users or operation of internet applications. IPSec can be used in one of two 
modes, transport mode, which is used between end entities supporting IPSec or 
between an end entity and a gateway if the gateway is treated as a host.  
 
The second mode is the tunnel mode which is commonly used to encrypt traffic 
between IPSec gateways, and it is used to build a virtual network between two 
separate subnets which is called a VPN. The protocol that is used to authenticate each 
point of the encrypted tunnel is the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Protocol:  
 
“Configuring VPN devices to authenticate via a CA is actually requires more 
work up front. However, it provides a scalable, centrally managed solution for 
revoking and reassigning the certificates used to create a trusted 
connection.”[40] 
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To configure a VPN to authenticate via a CA there are several steps that have to be 
completed. The first is the implementation of the PKI, the next step is to generate the 
key pairs for the VPN devices and then follow the standard method or registration, 
creation of certificate and entry of the certificate into the repository. After these steps 
have been completed then the IPsec access control lists can be configured  
2.13.4. Wireless Network Security 
Wireless network security can benefit from having a PKI in place to support its 
security services: 
   
“WLAN’s using Remote Authentication Dial in User Service (RADIUS) bolted 
on to existing servers or using self-signing digital certificates can be used in 
medium to large enterprise WLAN’s to enhance security.”[41]  
 
For increase security in authentication normal Protected Extensible Authentication 
Protocol-Extensible Authentication Protocol-Microsoft Challenge-Handshake 
Authentication Protocol (PEAP-EAP-MSCHAPv2) is not allowed because it is 
dependant on a password which is a method of single factor authentication. Instead 
digital signatures stored on the end entities hard drive are recommended as a method 
for providing a higher security protection.  
 
To implement PEAP-EAP-MSCHAPv2 a CA is required to provide dedicated digital 
certificates and not just certificates that are stored on end entities hard drives, it 
should also include a multi-tier hierarchy with an off line Root CA and an on-line 
directory. “Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) has introduced a number of 
innovations to cater for a wireless environment,”[42] The WAP Forum has adapted the 
protocol to all different certificate formats including X.509v3 and the certificates for 
the new Wireless Transport Layer Security (WTLS) protocol. Other adaptations of the 
protocol allow for certificate request protocols, WAP profiles within X.509v3 
certificates and the use of certificate Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) to limit the 
amount of bandwidth used by end entities when making requests and receiving 
replies.  
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2.13.5. Services provided by Trusted Third Parties 
A series of services can be provided by PKI with the use of Trusted Third Parties 
(TTPs) these include Time Stamping Authorities (TSAs), notarization and non-
repudiation services. These are described briefly in the following section: 
 
  “A time-stamping service supports assertions of proof that a datum existed 
before a particular time. A TSA may be operated as a (TTP) service, though 
other operational models may be appropriate, e.g., an organisation might 
require a TSA for internal time-stamping purposes.”[43]  
 
The TSA is a TTP that is trusted to have a valid and accurate time source that will 
accept validated requests and produce an accurate timestamp token. These tokens 
have a series of caveats associated with them including identifiers of requesting 
parties and security policies under which the timestamp token was issued. There are a 
number of security considerations that have to be taken into account when using a 
TSA. This will include procedures for revoking the TSAs certificate when the private 
key has been compromised.  
 
The length of keys used by the TSA has to be considered to allow sufficient cover 
time for the timestamp tokens and procedures put in place to re-stamp documents 
when the cover time of the key expires: 
 
“Notarization offers the registration of data under the authority or in the care 
of a TTP, thus making it possible to provide subsequent assurance of the 
accuracy of characteristics claimed for the data, such as content, origin, time 
and delivery.”[44] 
 
Finally non-repudiation, “Non-repudiation blocks the sender's false denial that the 
sender performed, or failed to perform a particular action.”[45] Non repudiation 
services are standardised in ISO/IEC 13888 which provides mechanisms for the 
provision of non-repudiation services. Non repudiation services produce non 
repudiation tokens that can be used to prove that an entity did “something” they later 
deny.  
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2.14. Key Management 
A solid key management framework is a requirement for PKI and there are various 
standards that can be utilised to provide this. The first standardised key management 
procedures came out of ANSI banking standards and have resulted in a series of key 
management standards that are used within the industry, including the X9.xx series of 
standards.  
 
Out of the work of NIST the ISO started to develop a series of key management 
standards and developed ISO/IEC 11770 which is a multipart key management 
standard, Part 1 is the key management framework and Part 2 is the key distribution 
mechanisms based on symmetric cryptography. Part 3 contains key distribution and 
agreements mechanisms based on asymmetric cryptography. ISO/IEC 17799 provides 
controls for cryptographic management of keys in Section 12.3.2 and states that:  
 
“All cryptographic keys should be protected against modification, loss and 
destruction. Equipment used generate, store and archive keys should be 
physically protected.”[46] 
 
There are three types of cryptographic keys that have to be protected; the public key 
which is the part of the asymmetric key pair that is distributed, the private key with is 
the part of the asymmetric key that has to be kept secret and the secret key with is a 
symmetric key which also has to be kept secret. Keys are organised in key hierarchies 
with higher level keys used to protect keys in the lower levels of the hierarchy, each 
of the keys in the hierarchy have limited use, thus providing some protection against 
attacks on the keys. The key at the highest level of the hierarchy is referred to as the 
Master Key; if this key is compromised it means that all of the keys at lower levels of 
the hierarchy can be compromised.  
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2.14.1. ISO/IEC 11770-1: Model for Key Lifecycle 
ISO/IEC 11770-1 describes a general model for key lifecycle that has three key states 
and five transition states. The three key states are pending active when a key is not 
used for normal operations, the active state where the key is used cryptographically to 
process information, and the post active state when the key is taken out of service and 
should only be allowed to be used for limited decipherment and verification of any 
data that had been generated by using the keys before revocation occurred.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Key Lifecycle Model 
 
 
The transition states described in ISO/IEC 11770-1 is a movement of a key from one 
state to another. The first state is generation which is the process of generating the key 
and must be carried out according to the policy and procedures determined by the 
organisation. The second state is activation which makes the key valid for use. The 
third state is deactivation which limits the keys use; this can be for various reasons 
including expiration or revocation of the key. The fourth state is reactivation which 
makes a deactivated key active again. Finally destruction is when the key’s lifecycle 
is ending, this can occur at the pending active stage if a key has been generated and is 
not required for any reason, or after the post active stage when the key has been 
compromised, ended its lifetime or been revoked for any other reason. 
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2.14.2. Key Management Services 
The key lifecycle on its own doesn’t provide a key management service. For this, key 
management services are required. ISO/IEC 11770-1 lists eleven possible key 
management services some of which are mandatory and some optional, these are 
shown in Table 4. The first service is key generation - this should be a random and 
unpredictable process and should not be able to be tampered with.  
 
Key registration is typically used with symmetric cryptography when an RA is used to 
register the end entities details and provide the CA with proof of the end entities 
identity.  Creating the key certificate is used primarily with asymmetric cryptography 
and involves the CA creating public key certificates and distribution of those 
certificates both to the end entity and to the repository/directory.  
 
Distribution of the key involves making the keys available to end entities that are 
required to have access to the material - the keying material can be either distributed 
cryptographically or by physical means. Installation and storage of the keys make the 
keying material available for use and to provide short to mid term storage for the key. 
Key derivation allows for the higher levels in the key hierarchy to derive keys for the 
level below it.  
 
Key archiving is the provision of long term storage for the keying material, the 
principle behind this is that the key should only be archived once it has become post 
active and will no longer be used for decipherment or verification but is kept to 
provide evidence if required in later disputes. The final services deal with the 
revocation of the key which removes the key from use, the deregistering of the key 
which deletes the entry in the RAs table that associates the end entity with the keying 
material, and the destruction of the key which simply deletes all of the copies of the 
keying material other than the copies that have been marked for archiving.  
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 Generation Activation Deactivation Reactivation Destruction 
Generate Key Mandatory N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Register Optional Optional N/A Optional N/A 
Create Key 
Certificate 
Optional Optional N/A Optional N/A 
Distribute Key Optional Optional N/A Mandatory N/A 
Install Key N/A Mandatory N/A Optional N/A 
Store Key Optional Optional Optional Optional N/A 
Derive Key N/A Optional N/A N/A N/A 
Archive Key N/A N/A Optional N/A Optional 
Revoke Key N/A N/A Optional N/A N/A 
Deregister Key N/A N/A N/A N/A Mandatory 
Destroy Key N/A N/A N/A N/A Mandatory 
 
Table 4: Key Management Services 
 
ISO/ICE 11770 identifies various models for communications between end entities 
for which key management is required, the end entities that require the support may 
be in the same security domain or may be from different security domains.  
2.15. Models for Key Distribution 
There are three models that have to be considered which provide the best possible 
option for modelling key distribution. These are key distribution between directly 
communicating parties, key distribution within one security domain and key 
distribution between security domains. Before describing these models there are 
numerous definitions that have explained. The first is key establishment which is a 
general term for making keys available to end entities, key control is the end entity 
that has control of the keying material and this can be either a desirable or undesirable 
property depending upon the operating environment. Key transport is a service when 
one of the end entities has complete authority over the key control process. Finally, 
key confirmation gives an end entity the assurance that another end entity is using 
recently established keying material. 
 
Key distribution within a single security domain is defined by a domain security 
policy which is defined by the security authority; the security authority also acts as a 
trusted intermediary providing assistance in the key establishment process. There are 
two methods of key establishment that have to be considered, these are, asymmetric 
techniques and symmetric techniques. With asymmetric techniques certificates need 
to be distributed and the security authority has to be contacted by both parties in order 
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to get each others public key certificates and with symmetric techniques Key 
Distribution Centres (KDC) or Key Translation Centres (KTC) have to be employed. 
2.15.1. Key Distribution Centre (KDC) 
A KDC is an entity that is trusted to generate and distribute keys to end entities that 
share keys with it. 
. 
 
 
Figure 7: Key Distribution Centre 
 
 
Figure 7 shows the use of a KDC within a single security domain. We have to assume 
that the KDC has a shared secret key with both entity A and entity B. Entity A will 
request the KDC to generate and distribute a secret key that can be shared between 
entity A and entity B. After the KDC generates the key it either enciphers it will with 
the key shared between itself and entity A. With entity A then forwarding it to entity 
B enciphered with their shared key (of entity A and entity B). Another way for entity 
B to get the keying material is for the KDC to encipher the generated secret key with 
the key it shares with entity B, and send the shared key for communication with entity 
A directly to entity B, after the key has been generated and distributed. Then entity A 
and entity B will have the shared key and will be able to communicate effectively 
with each other. 
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2.15.2. Key Translation Centre (KTC) 
A KTC as the name suggests, transports keys between entities that share a secret key 
with the KTC. 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Key Transport Centre 
 
 
Figure 8 shows the use of a KTC within a single security domain. We have to assume 
that the KTC has a shared secret key with both entity A and entity B. Entity A sends a 
key encipher with the shared key between itself and the KTC to the KTC. The KTC 
deciphers and re-enciphers it using the key it shares with entity B. Two methods that 
the KTC can employ to carry out this task is to firstly re-encipher and send it to entity 
A who will then forward it to entity B or the KTC can forward the key directly to 
entity B, this is also known as call forwarding.  
2.15.3. Key Distribution between Domains 
Distribution of keying material between domains deals with entities who wish to 
communicate directly with each other but reside within separate security domains and 
they only trust the security authority within their own domain. There are two cases 
which have to be considered, firstly entity A or entity B wish to obtain the public key 
certificate for the other entity or entity A and B wish to share a secret key.  
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Figure 9: Key Distribution between Domains 
 
 
Asymmetric or symmetric techniques can be used to provide the key establishment 
service. In Figure 9 symmetric key distribution is the preferred technique. The first 
step is for both entities to ask their own security authority to establish a key on their 
behalf, the security authorities then agree on secret material for both entities and this 
is distributed to the entities using a pre-existing shared key between the two security 
authorities. After the key has been generated and distributed then entity A and entity 
B will have the shared key and will be able to communicate effectively with each 
other. 
2.16. Certificates  
 “A public-key certificate (hereinafter "certificate") binds a public-key value to 
a set of information that identifies the entity (such as person, organisation, 
account, or site) associated with use of the corresponding private key (this 
entity is known as the "subject" of the certificate).”[47]  
 
Users of a PKI system require assurance that the private key belongs to the correct 
end entity with which the associated security mechanisms will be used i.e. digital 
signatures or encipherment. User assurance is given by the use of public key 
certificates which bind the user with the associated public key.  The CA digitally 
signs the certificate after it is assured that the identity of the user matches the 
associated public key. This assurance can come from either challenge/response 
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mechanisms or having the RA providing confirmation of a user’s identity to the CA. 
In 1988 X.509v1 was published as part of the X.500 directory recommendations and 
defines a standard for the X.509 certificate format, this was revised in 1993 where two 
more fields were added resulting in X.509v2.  In 1996 the ISO/IEC, ITU-T and ANSI 
X.9 developed the X.509v3 certificate standard to provide for interoperability, and 
adaptation of X.509v2, which added extension fields that could be either specified 
through the standards or defined by the requirements of organisations 
2.16.1. X.509v3 Certificate Syntax 
“The X.509v3 syntax is encoded using American Standard Notation 1 (ASN.1), this is 
a tag, length, value encoding systems for each element.”[48] ASN.1 provides a 
platform independent language to specify data structures and rules to encode data 
structures and enables two applications on different platforms that have been encoded 
differently to exchange data. The top level ASN.1 specification is shown in Figure 10.  
 
Certificate ::= Sequence {
tbsCertificate TBSCertificate
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier
signatureValue Bit String }
 
 
Figure 10: Top Level ASN.1 Specification 
 
The signatureValue field contains a digital signature computed upon the ASN.1 
encoded tbsCertificate this is used as the input to the signature function, this signature 
value is then ASN.1 encoded as the bit string and included in the certificates signature 
field. The X.509 signatureAlgorithm field shown in Figure 10 contains the identifier 
for the cryptographic algorithm used by the CA to sign the certificate. 
 
AlgortithmIdentifier ::= Sequence {
Algorithm object identifier
Parameters any defined by algorithm optional }
 
Figure 11: X.509 Signature Algorithm Field 
 
The algorithm identifier is used to identify a cryptographic algorithm and the object 
identifier component identifies the algorithm (such as DSA with SHA-1). The 
contents of the optional parameters field will vary according to the algorithm 
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identified. This field must contain the same algorithm identifier as the signature field 
in the sequence tbsCertificate. AlgorithmIdentifiers are defined for the following 
signature/hash combinations RSA with MD2, RSA with MD5, RSA with SHA-1 and 
DSA with SHA-1 
 
The X.509 tbsCertificate field contains the names of the subject and issuer, a public 
key associated with the subject, a validity period etc as shown in Figure 12.  
 
 
Figure 12: tbsCertificate Fields 
 
The version field describes the version of the encoded certificate. The default version 
is Version.1 .The serial number is an integer assigned by the CA to each certificate. It 
must be unique for each certificate issued by a CA - this is especially useful when 
constructing CRLs where the serial number can be used to identify the certificate 
being revoked. The signature algorithm identifier is also used to specify which 
algorithm was used to sign the certificate.  
 
The certificate validity period is the time interval during which the CA warrants that it 
will maintain information about the status of the certificate. The field is represented as 
a sequence of two dates, the date on which the certificate validity period begins and 
the date on which the certificate validity period ends. The unique identifier fields may 
only appear in the X.509 certificate version 2 or 3, the subject and issuer 
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UniqueIdentifiers are present in the certificate to handle the possibility of reuse of 
subject and / or issuer names over time. The SubjectPublicKeyInfo field is used to 
carry the public key and identify the algorithm with which the key is used. The 
algorithm is identified using the AlgorithmIdentifier structure. The Extensions field is 
only applicable for X.509v3 certificates, if present, this field can be used to hold 
policy information, information on key usage, subject alternative names, basic 
certificate constraints or certificate naming constraints.  
2.16.2. Certificate Policy (CP) 
When a CA issues a certificate it is giving assurance that a public key is bound to a 
user. Different certificates are issued depending on the process, procedures and 
policies depending on the organisation, application or use of the certificate. “The 
X.509 standard defines a certificate policy as:  
 
"A named set of rules that indicate the applicability of a certificate to a 
particular community and/or class of application with common security 
requirements. An X.509 Version 3 certificate may contain an indication of 
certificate policy, which may be used by a certificate user to decide whether or 
not to trust a certificate for a particular purpose.”[49]  
 
The certificate policy has to be recognized by all parties involved in the use of the 
certificate. The policy is represented in the certificate by a unique registered object 
identifier and the entity that registers the object identifier publishes a specification 
that can be scrutinised by end entities. A certificate policy can form the basis for 
accreditation of a CA.  
 
Accreditation can be gained against the implementation of one or more policies by the 
CA, when cross certification occurs the CAs must assess the others certificate policies 
to determine the level of trust that can be attached to the certificate within the scope of 
the defined trust model. In order to support certificate policies there are several X.509 
certificate policy fields including the certificate policies extension, policy mapping 
extension and the policy constraints extension field.  
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2.16.3. Certification Practice Statements (CPS) 
A Certification Practice Statement (CPS) is defined by the American Bar Association 
(ABA) as “A statement of the practices which a CA employs in issuing 
certificates.”[50] In 1995, the ABA in its guidelines expanded the definition to include 
a declaration by the CA of the trustworthiness of the system and the practices that it 
employs in the support of certificate issuance, the CPS could also be part of the 
contract between the CA and the end entity.  
 
The CA also has to lay down its responsibilities to any relying party including the 
legal relationships that exist between the parties and the CAs duty of care towards the 
relying parties, the CA also has to ensure that the relying party is made aware of the 
CPS and that any associated documents are accessible to the relying party. The CPS 
should define any standards that the CAs practices and procedures conform to; these 
references should indicate the suitability of the CAs practices and procedures to the 
relying entities purposes.  
2.16.4. Certificate Revocation 
When certificates are issued it is not for a finite period. At some point the certificate 
has to be revoked, this can be for numerous reasons including expiration of the 
certificate after a certain period. Changes to the name of the end entity, association 
between the subject and the CA or compromise of a private key are all reasons why a 
CA would need to revoke a certificate.[51] Certificates can either be revoked online or 
offline. Off line revocation takes the form of CRLs, on line revocation takes the form 
of OCSP, both concepts are explained in detail in the following sections.   
2.16.5. Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) 
X.509 defines Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) as the method for certificate 
revocation; this involves the CA issuing a CRL which is a time stamped list that 
identifies the certificates that have been revoked, this occurs periodically as is 
described as off-line certificate revocation. The CRL is published in the repository 
with the certificates that have been revoked are identified by their serial number, 
when an end entity wishes to use a certificate it not only checks the signature and the 
validity but will also check to see if the certificate is on the CAs CRL, this is an 
obvious disadvantage of this method as there could be long periods between CRLs 
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being issued. An advantage of this system is that the CRLs can be issued in the same 
way as the certificates in that they are entered into the register for relying parties to 
check.  
2.16.6. Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) 
Another method of certificate revocation is to use an online service, namely, Online 
Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP). “OCSP enables applications to determine the 
revocation state of an identified certificate,”[52] it has the advantage over CRLs that in 
fulfils a requirement of being able to carry out revocation in a more timely manner. 
OCSP clients issue requests to an OCSP responder and in the time between the 
request and response, suspends acceptance of the certificate.  
 
An OCSP request contains the protocol version, service request, target certificate 
identifier and any optional extensions that the OCSP responder may or may not 
process. When a request is made the OCSP responder determines if the message is 
well formed, the responder is configured to provide the service requested and that the 
request contains the information required by the OCSP responder. If any of the 
conditions are not met then the OCSP responder sends the requester an error message 
otherwise a response is sent to the requester with the required information.  
 
The response from the OCSP responder can conform to various types, the basic type 
of response that must be supported by all OCSP servers and clients is that all 
definitive response messages must be digitally signed and that the key used to sign 
must belong to either the CA who issued the certificate, a trusted responder whose 
public key is trusted by the requester or a CA designated responder who holds a 
specially marked certificate issued directly by the CA, this indicates that the CA can 
issue OSCP responses for that CA.  
 
A definitive response message contains the version of the response syntax, name of 
responder, responses for each of the certificates in a request, optional extensions, 
signature algorithm OID and the signature computed across hash of the response. The 
response for each of the certificates in a request consists of a target certificate 
identifier, certificate status value, response validity interval and any optional 
extensions. There are three types of definitive responses that the OCSP specification 
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defines; the first is a good response this states that the certificate is not revoked 
though it does not determine if the certificate was ever issued or that the response was 
within the validity period of the certificates lifetime. The next definitive response is 
revoked which defines that the certificate has been revoked either permanently or 
temporarily and the last definitive response is unknown, this response is issued when 
the OCSP responder does not know about the certificate being requested.  
2.17. Building Trust in PKI 
“The degree to which a certificate user can trust the binding embodied in a 
certificate depends on several factors. These factors include the practices 
followed by the CA in authenticating the subject; the CAs operating policy 
procedures, security controls, the subject’s obligations and the stated 
undertakings and legal obligations of the CA.”[53]  
 
A relying party that requires a certificate to provide assurance that an entity is bound 
to a specific public key will require the validation of a certificate this may necessitate 
the use of certificate chains called certificate paths these are required because a 
relying party is only ever initialized with a limited number of assured CA public keys.  
2.17.1. Hierarchical Modelling of CAs 
There are different ways that CAs can be configured to provide the user with 
verifiable certificate paths that they can trust, the most widely used is the hierarchical 
model described in IETF RFC 1422.[54] The first level in the hierarchical model is the 
Internet Policy Registration Authority (IPRA) acts as the root for Privacy 
Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail (PEM) certification hierarchy at level 1 and 
it issues certifications for the next lower level in the hierarchy, all certification paths 
start with IPRA. Policy Certification Authorities (PCAs) are at level 2 of the hierarchy 
with each of the PCAs being certified by the IPRA.  
 
The PCA has to publish its own policy and CPS with respect to the certification of 
subordinate authorities in the CA hierarchy. Level 3 and lower of the hierarchy is the 
CA; these are certified by the PCA above it in the hierarchy. The CA can only issue 
certificates for entities whose names are subordinate to itself in the X.500 naming tree 
with the trust implied by the PCA name. The rules associated with the hierarchical 
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model ensure that the CAs below the PCA in the hierarchy are constrained to the 
entities that they can certify with user systems being able to automatically check the 
naming conventions and ensure that the subordination rule has been followed.  
Using X.509v3 certificates: 
 
 “The requirements of RFC 1422 can be addressed using certificate 
extensions, without the need to restrict the CA structures used. In particular, 
the certificate extensions relating to certificate policies obviate the need for 
PCAs and the constraint extensions obviate the need for the name 
subordination rule. As a result a more flexible architecture is supported.”[55]  
 
The more flexible approach to the architecture allows the certification paths start with 
the CA in the relying entities domain with the CAs public key the top level of the 
hierarchy, this local domain tends to have the advantage of being the most trusted. 
Name constraints can be imposed by using the extension filed in the X.509v3 
certificate and the policy extension fields and policy mappings can replace the 
concept of the PCA, this approach allows a greater degree of automation with 
automated determination of certification paths.  
2.17.2. Building Trust in TTPs through Standardization  
ISO/IEC 14516:2002[56] standardises the guidelines for the use of management of 
TTPs and as a CA is essentially a CA we can use the guidelines laid down in this 
standard to ensure that organisations can build and manage trusted relationships with 
the TTPs that they select to carry out the selected services. The first point to note is 
that a security authority has to have the ability to chose the TTP that best suites its 
needs and the TTP should have the ability to choose its clients this ensures that a TTP 
cannot be forced on an organisation by, for example, regulation or government 
interference. Trust cannot be established by the use of technical means it has to be 
established using sound business principles this means that a contract has to be put in 
place between the TTP and the organisation using its services:  
 
“Agreements with third parties involving accessing, processing, 
communicating or managing the organisation’s information should be covered 
by all security requirements.”[57]  
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Table 5 lists some of the terms that should be considered for inclusion in agreements 
with TTPs these are defined in ISO/IEC 17799:2005. 
 
Control Description 
Information Security Policy  The policy statement should be a high 
level documents explaining the services 
offered by the TTP 
Controls to ensure asset protection  This includes procedures, process for 
logical and  physical protection of 
assets and restrictions of use 
User and administrator training 
methods, procedure and security  
All staff should be trained to a 
satisfactory standard; this should be a 
continual process.  
Ensure User awareness for Information 
Security responsibilities and issues 
User have to be made aware of the 
rules and regulations surrounding their 
responsibilities  
A clear reporting structure and agreed 
reporting formats 
This is important to ensure correct and 
timely passage of information between 
TTP and clients 
Access control policies Access required by the TTP to client 
information and the processes that 
cover access requests.  
Incident Handling Arrangements for reporting, 
notification and investigation of 
information security incidents.  
Product/service description A description of the product or service 
being provided and details of the 
security levels of the information being 
handled. 
Service Level Agreements  The target level of service as well as 
unacceptable levels of service  
Monitoring of TTP The right of the client to monitor the 
activities of the TTP in relation to the 
organisations assets. 
Audit of TTP The right of the client to audit the TTP 
as defined by agreement 
Legal Liabilities Ensuring that legal requirements are 
met by both parties 
Business Continuity Availability and reliability 
requirements are met 
Termination of Agreements Contingency plans should be in place in 
case of either party terminating the 
contract.  
TTPs and subcontractors Ensuring adequate security  controls are 
put in place  
 
Table 5: IS0/IEC 17799: 2005 TTP Management Requirements 
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2.18. Legal and Regulatory Aspects of PKI  
Any organisation that issues qualified certificates i.e. digital certificates is known as a 
Certification Service Provider (CSP), the CSP vouches for the authenticity of the 
binding of an end entities identity to their public key. In May of 2000 the Alliance for 
Electronic Business set up an industry led approval process called tScheme, this is 
“the independent, industry-led, self-regulatory scheme set up to create strict 
assessment criteria, against which it will approve Trust Services.”[58] tScheme touts 
itself as an essential element in organisations and consumer’s ability to trust when 
dealing with e-business transactions though it can be argued that self regulation is not 
a true form of regulation and is only put in place to correct market failure.  
 
Self regulation is normally delegated by Government to industry to manage and 
regulate the industry in the case of CAs tScheme which aims to meet the requirements 
of Part I of the UK Communications Act 2000[59] lays out the following; the register 
of approved providers, this lays out the duty of the Secretary of State to establish and 
maintain a register of approved providers of cryptographic support services. 
Arrangements for the grant of approvals, for anyone providing cryptographic support 
services approval has to be granted by the Secretary of State with the approvals being 
granted within the limits of certain conditions laid out within the law. Delegation of 
approval functions outlines the regulation is respect to the Secretary of State 
delegating responsibility for carrying out the provisions of the Act.  
 
Restrictions on disclosure of information describes the restrictions and caveats in 
place in dealing with the disclosure of information, pen ultimately regulations under 
Part I of the Act gives the Secretary of State the right to amend the regulations though 
any changes have to put in front of Parliament before they would become law. The 
final section on Part I is the provision of cryptographic support services, this is a 
broad definition of the term, the definition just means the service and does not refer to 
the supply of use of computer hardware or software unless integral to the provision of 
the service. There is little requirement to use a self regulated, fee charging 
organisation when there is Governmental regulation is in place for the protection of 
all parties involved in the use of cryptographic support services.  
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2.18.1. Electronic Signature Legislation 
Worldwide adoption of Electronic Signature Law was aimed at allowing countries to 
facilitate the use of electronic signatures and to contribute to their legal recognition. 
Countries adopted various forms of electronic signature law to provide both 
confidence and trust to the consumer and to business. Electronic signature laws allow 
for the equal treatment of signature technologies (i.e. handwritten signature equal to 
an electronic signature equal to an advanced electronic signature) and accept that as 
technology advances then authentication methods will also change.  
 
Electronic signature law also allow for compliance with a set of rules for the 
Certification Authority, Signatory and any relying third parties and lays out any 
liability that may arise for each of the parties involved. In international terms 
Electronic signature laws allow for the provision of recognizing foreign certificates 
through cross border treaties to allow interoperability at a global level. 
2.18.2. EU Directive 1999/93/EC 
One such law comes from the EU Directive 1999/93/EC.[60] The main aim of this 
directive is the promotion of interoperability of electronic signature products because 
interoperability is the key to expansion and uptake both in business and government 
circles. It also builds trust in electronic signatures by recognising rapid technological 
advances will allow authentication of electronic data thus allowing for freer 
movement of goods and services within the internal market. As the directive sets a 
balance between consumer and business needs and sets out the liability of those 
involved trust is created which is increasingly important in dealing with cross border 
activities with a view to increasing competitiveness and that the directive also 
facilitates a voluntary accreditation scheme that again will increase trust and 
confidence in electronic signatures.  
 
The EU directive 1999/93/EC has some fundamental weaknesses, primarily it does 
not seek to harmonize contract law and is unconcerned with procedural requirements 
this can lead to “misunderstandings” in contract negotiations as an organisation from 
one country may not be fully aware of laws regulating the use of Electronic 
Signatures in another, although the Rome Convention goes some way in alleviating 
these concerns they are still prevalent. There is also concerns on the interpretation of 
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the directive within each member state, although there is a voluntary accreditation 
scheme is available many organisations may see this as another overhead to be avoid 
and may or may not be more useful if it was made compulsory. The UK Electronic 
Communications act 2000 says that accreditation is not compulsory; however CAs 
should register them and provide assurance that they have been independently 
assessed against standards of quality which could be a good measure to be introduced 
into the EU Directive to give further assurance of trust.  
2.19. Summary  
In summary, PKI's offer the ability to offer a foundation for a large organisation to 
build a comprehensive security architecture. PKI can enable applications to add 
security to their own interactions with other data, resources or entities and it can 
provide the core services of Confidentiality, Integrity and Authentication as well as 
enabling further security services.  
 
To meet the stated objectives this section covers the basic principles of PKI including 
the history of PKI, fundamental principles and primary components and services. A 
basic PKI infrastructure is defined along with the terminology relating to it with 
detailed descriptions of each component. There is a description of the cryptographic 
algorithms, both asymmetric and symmetric involved in a functioning PKI along with 
the security services that can be provided by these algorithms. There is a 
comprehensive key management section detailing with standardised models for key 
management and various methods of key distribution.  
 
X.509v3 certificates are described in detail including the certificate policy, certificate 
practice statements and various methods of certificate revocation, digital signatures 
are described in a low level of detail to support the certificate section. The section 
aims to allow the reader an understanding of the technical issues surrounding PKI and 
the ability to determine the drivers for delivering an outsourced PKI and how, 
ultimately, how to determine the core and enabled services that are offered by PKI 
and the methods employed by an organisation to ensure trust in their outsource 
partner ensuring that they are treated as a TTP. 
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3. Basic Principles of Outsourcing 
There are many ways in which a PKI can be successfully outsourced. This chapter 
will introduce outsourcing in general but more specifically outsourcing a PKI: 
 
• The History of Outsourcing 
• Business Reasons for Outsourcing 
• Reasons for Outsourcing Security Services 
• A Methodology of Security Engineering for Outsourcing 
• Governing and Managing Outsourcing  
• Advantages and Disadvantages of Outsourcing 
• Multi-sourcing Strategies 
 
Each topic in this chapter introduces different aspects of outsourcing PKI. A section 
of this chapter is dedicated to multi-sourcing, a new concept in outsourcing whereby 
organisations blend information security services from internal and external providers 
for optimal results. This is an important concept for the reader to understand as multi-
sourcing strategies are becoming more prevalent in the business world.   
3.1. Introduction 
The term Outsourcing entered the business lexicon in the early 1980s and described 
the process of acquiring sources or services from external sources. A dictionary 
definition of Outsourcing is “to procure (as some goods or services needed by a 
business or organisation) under contract with an outside supplier.”[61]  
 
Today’s modular organisational structure means that the acquisition of goods or 
services needed by the business does not have to come from an outside supplier, 
goods or services can now be procured from one part of the business to another 
through “in-house” service and supply agreements.  
 
Outsourcing is not always the best option for an organisation. There may be cases 
where it is impossible for an organisation to outsource, such as Governments, Military 
or organisations dealing with Critical National Infrastructure. For those who can 
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outsource it has to be a strategic decision as it contracts out important functions of the 
organisation to a specialized provider.  
 
These providers have to become more than just a solution provider but they have to 
become an extension of the organisation itself. 
 
“The difference between simply supplementing resources by subcontracting 
and actual outsourcing, is that the latter involves substantial restructuring of 
particular business activities including, often, the transfer of staff from a host 
company to a specialist, usually smaller, company with the required core 
competencies.”[62] 
3.2. History of Outsourcing  
Industry has always looked at ways of gaining competitive edge over rivals, from the 
days of large locally owned companies organisations have looked at ways to increase 
profitability, reduce costs and maximize production. Historically, outsourcing is not a 
new concept in the United States from the mid 1920s textile mills moved their 
operations from the expensive towns in New England to the Southern States where 
costs were substantially cheaper. After the Second World War components and 
assembled products were sourced to offshore factories, this approach was particularly 
prevalent in the United States as it had one of the only post war economies that hadn’t 
been destroyed by five years of conflict reaped the benefits from cheaper overseas 
labour.   
 
Year Focus Approach 
1960s Hardware Service and Facility 
Management 
1970s Software Facility and Operation 
Management 
1980s Hardware and Software 
Standardization 
Customization 
Management 
1990s Total Solution Asset Management  
 
Table 6: Timeline of IT Outsourcing Trends 
 
The introduction of mainframes by IBM in the 1960s ensured that the IT-Business 
begun in earnest. “IT outsourcing started with time-sharing and processing services, 
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as computers were very expensive.[63] In the 1970s standard application packages 
were introduced and the contracting of programming started a new trend in 
outsourcing.   
 
The timeline of IT outsourcing trends (Table 6) shows that the evolution of 
outsourcing changed along with technological advances, from the early days of 
outsourcing in manufacturing through the 1970s and 1980s which were service 
orientated until today when the emphasis is on total solution outsourcing.  
3.2.1. 1960s and 1970s 
The 1960s and 70s saw the beginning of the process of globalization, no longer were 
organisations satisfied with operating single industry companies they wanted to 
diversify to protect organisations from a downturn in profits in any one sector. This 
diversity caused many organisations to overstretch themselves and the management 
structures became complicated and over bearing, this proved to stifle the flexibility of 
organisations to deal with changes in the modern world.  
 
At this point organisations started to realise that they had to concentrate on their core 
businesses, that’s where they were making profits. This realization brought about the 
modern term of outsourcing, functions that were not directly connected to the core 
business or that the organisation was unqualified to carry out were outsourced. As 
each stage of the process became more successful for organisations then they looked 
at ways to lower costs and managers embraced it with vigour outsourcing nearly all of 
the activities not relating to the core business, including Human Resources, 
Distribution, Accounting etc.  
3.2.2. 1980s and 1990s  
As technology boomed in the 1980s and 90s American and Japanese firms started to 
outsource more of their electronics manufacturing to cheaper locations in South East 
Asia to meet the demand of western consumers. Computing power was increasing and 
prices were dropping and to keep those prices down organisations had to find cheaper 
ways of producing their products and the push to outsourcing to even cheaper 
locations began. By the 1990s the term Global Production Networks (GPN’s) was 
common this was defined as: 
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 “Interconnected functions and operations through which goods and services 
are produced and distributed - have become both organisationally more 
complex and also increasingly global in their geographical extent..”[64]  
 
The concept of GPN allowed organisations to be competitive, for the price of one 
technician in the UK, Europe or the USA organisations could have ten technicians for 
the same price in the developing world.  
3.2.3. 2000 to Present Day 
By the end of the 1990s and the beginning of 2000 outsourcing became incredibly 
profitable, the strategic objectives of organisations changed and only a portion of the 
core business was carried out by organisations with all other business functions being 
carried out by outsourced providers. The main driver for this change was the 
distribution of computer networks and the ease of carrying out e-business, as 
technology allowed organisations to more easily achieve their business objectives it 
also allowed for more and more of the organisations business processes to be 
outsourced.  
 
“In 2003, outsourcing accumulated $298.5 billion in global revenues, Gartner 
Inc. data shows. At least 3.3 million US jobs and $136 billion in wages will be 
outsourced to India, China, Russia, Ukraine, Pakistan, and Vietnam by 
2015.”[65]  
 
Outsourcing is and will continue to be a strategy employed by organisations to meet 
its business objectives though as the decade progresses. Outsourcing contracts with a 
value of £27.06 million (€40 million) bracket was up by 78% in 2006, this equates to 
£8.23 billion (€12.3 billion) of new business.[66] 
3.3. Business Reasons for Outsourcing  
Outsourcing is driven by the tactical and strategic objectives of an organisation in 
order to improve its operational and financial effectiveness in a competitive 
marketplace. Outsourcing has evolved to a point where it is the preferred method of 
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many organisations as if fulfils the needs of the organisation, investors as well as 
helping the business position itself better in the marketplace. [67]  
 
Reasons Sought Benefits 
Enhancing effectiveness by focussing on core 
skills 
Increase flexibility to meet changing business 
conditions, demand for products, services and 
technologies 
Organisationally Driven 
Reasons 
Increase product and service value, customer 
satisfaction and share holder value 
Improve operating performance 
Obtain expertise, skills and technologies that 
would not otherwise be available  
Improved management and control 
Improve risk management 
Acquire innovative ideas  
Improvement Driven Reasons 
Improve credibility and image by associating with 
superior providers 
Reduce investments in assets and free up these 
resources for other purposes 
Financially Driven Reasons 
Generate cash by transferring assets to the provider 
Gain market access and business opportunities 
through the provider’s network 
Accelerate expansion by tapping into the providers 
developed capacity, processes and systems 
Expand sales and production capacity during 
periods when such expansion could not be financed
Revenue Driven Reasons 
Commercially exploit the existing skills 
Reduce costs through superior provider 
performance and the providers lower cost structure 
Cost Driven Reasons 
Turn fixed costs into variable costs 
Give employees a stronger career path Employee Driven Reasons 
Increase commitment and energy in non core areas 
 
Table 7: Reasons to Outsource and Benefits Sought 
 
Table 7[68] details the most common business reasons for organisations to outsource 
and the benefits that they aim to achieve. 
 
Outsourcing allows organisations to concentrate on their core business whilst 
operational necessities are carried out by their partners that are experts in their 
respective fields. One of the greatest burdens for an organisation is the day to day 
running of systems in that cost valuable resources, both in terms of money and time, 
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when the answer could simply be to outsource allowing assets to be used to make the 
core business more effective.  
 
“On average IT departments spend over 70% of their time and effort in basic 
operational tasks with less than 30% available for research, development and 
improvement.”[68] 
 
3.4. Reasons for Outsourcing Security Services 
As there is a continual change in the organisation’s threat landscape it is critical that 
the organisation maintains reliable and effective information security. Any decision 
on outsourcing security solutions has to be based on the considerations in the context 
of managing business risks.[69] Risks can be identified and treated as part of a risk 
treatment plan, this includes acceptance, mitigation and transference of risks.[70] 
Forming strategic partnerships with security service providers is an acceptable 
treatment option for the transferral of the risks associated with information security. 
Specific reasons for outsourcing managed security services, including PKI, can be 
summarised in by using “Ten Reasons to Outsource Managed Security Services” by 
Veritas. These are shown in Table 8 below.[71]  
 
Reason Description 
Device management and 
monitoring can be mundane and 
tedious. 
As skilled staff are in short supply having the 
system monitored by a security provider frees 
up those individuals to focus on more pressing 
tasks.  
The best in-house information 
misses the big picture. 
Concentrating on only the internal PKI system 
and not focussing on the wider trends and 
threats to the organisation means that the threat 
landscape can change quicker than the 
organisation can.  
Threats don’t go on vacation or 
take holidays. 
As with device management skilled staff are in 
short supply. The infrastructure has to be 
continually monitored and relying on one or 
two individuals presents a business risk.  
Information Security is patchy and 
contradictory, a moving target.  
It has become increasingly difficult for just one 
organisation to understand the impact of 
evolving threats. A security provider is in a 
stronger position to understand and combat 
these threats.  
Security tools come in a box: 
security solutions don’t.  
PKI is a complex system and the configuration, 
management and monitoring of it is difficult, 
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time consuming and expensive.  
Your operational costs may 
escalate with each new security 
initiative. 
Outsourcing security solutions can lower 
operating costs by using a vendor neutral 
provider. It will also help with lowering costs 
for recruiting, training and retaining staff.   
You worry about every threat, 
hack, virus, or worm that may 
attack. 
When the organisation outsource to a security 
provider that provider takes on the 
responsibility for the overall effectiveness of 
the system leaving the organisation’s staff to 
concentrate on its core business.  
Non compliance is a business risk. Whether or not the organisation is aware of its 
regulatory obligations, the business can be 
liable for security breaches and non 
compliance when working within certain 
industries.  
Find out how well your security 
initiatives are doing.  
Organisations invest heavily in its technology 
and people. With the evolving threats and 
increase regulation and outsource provider may 
be better placed to look after the organisation’s 
systems and take the burden of the time 
consuming activities associated with keeping 
up to date with threats and regulation.  
Strategic outsourcing keeps you 
focussed on your business.  
Outsourcing can help the organisation 
maximise its technology investment and ensure 
that the focus remains on creating a more 
secure environment for the enterprise and 
making the business more profitable.  
 
Table 8: Veritas: Top 10 Reasons to Outsource Managed Security Services 
 
Trust is the key with outsourcing, it is essential that the organisation and it’s 
outsource partner have the necessary framework in place such as the existence of 
contracts, non-disclosure agreements and service level agreements.[72] With any 
outsource agreement there will always be situations that arise that will require the 
revision of agreements, this is an area that requires the trust between the two parties. 
When outsourcing security services it is also important to note that an organisation 
can quickly become dependant on its partner.  
In our opinion then advantages of outsourcing PKI both in terms of the business and 
as an outsourced security solution far outweigh the disadvantages. Though the 
organisation has to ensure that the outsource partner that is selected is right for its 
business, that is the aim of our AB-5C model for outsourcing PKI.  
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3.5. A Methodology of Security Engineering for outsourcing PKI 
An organisations outsourcing methodology usually involves in the engagement of 
processes that are designed to be mutually beneficial to both the organisation and the 
outsource partner, although every partnership will be decidedly different there are 
certain steps that should be undertaken.   
 
We propose the methodology used for a security of engineering of PKI outsourcing is 
System Security Engineering – Capability Model as defined in ISO/IEC 21827.[73] 
This Model was selected as it was designed to be used by a variety of organisations 
who are involved in product development, system integration, administration and the 
provision of security services.  
 
The SSE-CM model was developed to be used as: 
 
• A tool for engineering organisations to evaluate security engineering practices 
and improve systems. 
• A method for security engineering evaluation organisations can establish 
confidence in an organisation’s systems and as an input into the assurance 
programme. 
• A mechanism for customers to evaluate a provider’s security engineering 
capability.  
 
As such it is well suited as the preferred methodology for security engineering of PKI 
Outsourcing. The benefits of this model include: 
 
• Continuity 
o Using knowledge from previous efforts can be used in future efforts. 
• Repeatability 
o Ensuring projects can be completed with repeated successful effort. 
• Efficiency  
o Allowing developers and the evaluators to work more efficiently.  
• Assurance 
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o Giving all parties involved the assurance that security needs of the 
organisation are being addressed.  
 
The model will describe the characteristics of the methodology and security 
engineering processes that must exist in order to ensure good security engineering on 
part of the organisation and the outsource supplier. The model provides a standard 
metric for security engineering practices and covers: 
 
• The entire security engineering life cycle. 
• The entirety of the organisation. 
• Interactions with concurrent engineering activities. 
• Interactions with other organisations.  
 
 
Engineering 
Process
Assurance 
Process Risk Process
Assurance Argument Risk Information
Product, System or 
Service
 
 
Figure 13: Security Engineering Process Overview 
 
Figure 13 shows the ISO/IEC 21827 Security Engineering Process Overview.[74] The 
three areas defined, engineering process, assurance process and risk process work 
together to ensure that the security engineering process meets the goals and the 
objectives of the organisation.  
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3.5.1. Risk Process  
Security Engineering is concerned with the managing of risks to business information. 
It should reduce the likelihood of information security incidents occurring leading to 
breaches of Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability. Security Engineering aims to 
prevent incidents occurring, reduce the negative effects of incidents which do occur, 
improve recovery from these incidents and learn lessons to help with future 
prevention. 
 
The Risk Management process is made up of several dependant processes and 
procedures within itself. These being The Organisations Security Requirements, Risk 
assessment, Risk Treatment, Risk Acceptance, Risk Communication and Risk 
monitoring and Reviewing. Risk assessment can be further divided into risk analysis 
and risk evaluation. The security requirements of an organisation can be categorised 
into the overall business strategy of the organisation and the loss impact to these 
requirements dependant upon incidents. 
 
The Risk assessment process is a process defined by the Risk analysis and Risk 
evaluation. Risk analysis is the process of identifying risks, describing risks and the 
estimating and quantifying the impact of these risks. The two main types of risk 
analysis are quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative assigns an annual impact figure 
to the impact of an incident upon an asset whilst qualitative measures the impacts 
based upon tuition and experience. The result of either process is to provide 
information to management in an understandable format for consideration and 
budgeting. Once the risk analysis process has been completed risk evaluation is 
necessary to compare the estimated risks against the risk criteria or objectives of the 
organisation. The evaluation process defines whether or not the risk should be 
accepted or treated. 
 
The Risk treatment process begins with the organisation’s objectives and criteria for 
determining whether or not risks should be accepted. In general terms risks are 
accepted if it is surmised that the risk is low or the cost of treatment is in excessive of 
the organisations budgetary acceptance of that risk. There are several options open to 
the treatment of identified risks:[75] 
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• Accept the risk 
• Avoid the risk 
• Manage the risk 
• Transfer the risk 
 
By accepting the risk the organisation has knowingly and objectively accepted the 
risks provided they are within the organisation’s policy and criteria for risk 
acceptance. The managing of risk involves the applying of appropriate controls to 
meet the requirements of the risk assessment process. Controls should bring the level 
of risk exposure to an acceptable level, without reducing the effectiveness of other 
controls, within the requirements of the organisation’s objectives. Controls will very 
rarely eliminate risk totally so therefore the residual risk must be within the 
organisations risk appetite and acknowledged as so. The transfer or risk is normally 
handled by transferring the risk to a third party in the form of insurance against the 
identified risk.  
 
3.5.2. Engineering Process 
Security engineering is a process of concept, design, deployment, operation, 
maintenance and decommission.[76] This process is not solely in the realms of security 
engineering but has to take into account other engineering activities such as systems 
and communications engineering. This model puts the emphasis on security engineers 
working as part of larger teams with co-ordinated activities with other engineering 
disciplines to ensure that security is not left as a stand alone activity but is part of the 
full design.  
 
Information gathered from the risk process along with full system requirements, 
organisational policy, procedures and a whole host of other information is brought 
together to identify the security requirements of the organisation. After this process is 
complete the security engineers can identify specific requirements and begin the 
process of creating solutions.  In the case of the model we are suggesting for the 
outsourcing of PKI the results from the modelling of organisational outsourcing based 
on the requirements of the PKI (Section 4.7) will be taken into account when 
specifying the requirements. 
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In specifying the requirements for an organisations PKI part of the security 
engineering process will be to determine whether there is a requirement to outsource 
or can the security requirements be met “in-house.” There is one major problem with 
determining these requirements, that is, the decision cannot be made on the basis of 
security alone. A range of considerations have to be taken into account, this can vary 
from cost, risk and ease of use through to more problematic areas such as: [77] 
 
• Difficulty retrieving keys and certificates 
• Questionable value of certified key representations 
• Certificate processing complexity 
• Costly certificates 
• Problematic cross domain trust management 
• Naming semantics 
• Use with insecure clients 
• Privacy compromises 
 
It is the responsibility of the security engineer to ensure that to ensure that these areas 
are addressed to ensure that during the security engineering process that these issues 
to not re-appear and introduce new risks into the system later in the lifecycle.  
 
3.5.3. Assurance Process  
A failing of the SSE-CMM model is that it only contributes one aspect of the 
assurance process and that is in the confidence gained by organisations due to the 
repeatability of results in the security engineering process. It is aimed primarily at 
mature organisations as those are more likely to be able to produce positive repeat 
results. For immature organisations it may not possible to provide positive repeatable 
results, in our opinion this is a major failing of the SSE-CMM assurance process. A 
better option for the assurance process would be the Common Criteria which was 
standardised in ISO/IEC 15408.[78]  
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The Common Criteria is a harmonisation between ITSEC [79] and the US Federal 
Criteria [80] and is split into three parts: 
 
• Part 1: Introduction 
• Part 2: Security Functionality Requirements 
• Part 3: Security Assurance Requirements 
 
The Common Criteria allows for the evaluation of both products and systems with 
product evaluation is done against an approved protection profile which is an 
independent statement of the security needs of the system in a particular situation. The 
flexibility of the Common Criteria is provided by the use of a Target of Evaluation 
(TOE), a Security Target (ST) and a Protection Profile (PP).  
 
A Target of Evaluation is either a product or a system. The standard uses the term 
product to refer to either a single product or a system of products. It is important to 
note that a single product may be used in a variety of different circumstances 
operational environments and produce different results in each on of these. Hence, we 
define a Target of Evaluation (TOE) to be any product or system that is being used in 
one particular way.  
 
A security target is a product-dependant statement about the security that a TOE aims 
to give. It is roughly equivalent to the information provided by the sponsor in an 
ITSEC evaluation. However, an ST can mandate that a TOE match the levels of 
security demanded by a protection profile. This allows for the classification of 
products in the same way as in the US Federal Criteria 
 
ISO/IEC 15408 part 3 [81] describes a set of Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) from 
EAL0 to EAL7. The defined evaluation assurance levels (EALs), i.e. the levels 
defining how rigorous an evaluation should be, are mostly aligned with ITSEC and 
TCSEC (Orange Book). The only EAL that is not aligned with earlier evaluation 
criteria as EAL1. This corresponds to simple functional testing using the interface and 
security functionality defined in the protection profile. This analysis should be 
performed by an independent body.  
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Whichever method is used to provide assurance certain levels of evidence have to be 
produced to support the stated claims, evidence is normally in the form of 
documentation produced during the course of the engineering process. 
3.6. Governing and Managing Outsourcing  
When the organisation has selected it’s outsource partner and the solution is being 
provided then the relationship has to be managed effectively and good governance 
procedures put in place. A good governance structure can provide: 
 
 “A framework for the leadership, organisational structures and business 
processes, standards and compliance with theses standards, which ensures 
that the organisations information systems support and enable the 
achievement of its strategies and objectives.”[82]  
 
It is important that the governance and management procedures include what steps the 
outsource partner will undertake to meet its own legal and liability obligations, having 
clear escalation procedures, ensuring that there are training and awareness 
programmes in place so that all staff are aware of their responsibilities and that 
disaster recovery and business continuity plans are in place. 
 
Relationship Management is an aspect of outsourcing that is often overlooked; it is up 
to the organisation doing the outsourcing to manage the relationships effectively as 
this is something that is not always factored into the planning phase. A hidden cost 
that can occur is the provision of a relationship manager and a technical support team 
to manage the relationship and the technical aspects of the outsourced service, these 
are full time positions that are required in order to ensure that transactions are carried 
out according the pre-agreed timescales, standards and quality.  
 
“To build the relationship effectively, the relationship manager and the 
organisation should be active in monitoring and evaluating performance and 
in addressing issues. If this does not occur, the provider’s performance is 
likely to suffer. This might happen because the provider takes shortcuts that 
are not caught and corrected.”[83]  
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It is common sense that something as important as outsourcing should be managed 
properly, the organisation although not trusting an outsource partner to provide for its 
core business. It would not be able to operate if its support functions were to fail, not 
only leading in loss of income but it could prove catastrophic if the organisations 
reputation was fundamentally damaged.  
3.7. Advantages of Outsourcing PKI 
The advantages of outsourcing PKI include: 
 
• Saving’s on setup and operating costs  
• Provision of all in one services 
• Quick Implementation 
• Scalable solutions 
• Reliability of solutions  
• Organisationally Driven 
 
Building and operating an in-house PKI can be extremely expensive, the average PKI 
installation is in the region of $1 million.[84] These costs include the technical 
expertise to configure the software, setting up the system policies, and the 
registration, issuance and revocation of digital certificates. Outsourcing can provide a 
method of allowing organisation’s to set up a PKI through outsourcing as there is no 
up front investment in infrastructure, and no requirement for the recruiting and 
training of new staff. There is a downside too, although initial set up and operating 
costs can be low in the long term because the organisation will have to pay year on 
year for the issuance and revocation of certificates as long as the contract lasts.  
 
Outsource partners can provide a “one stop shop” for PKI solutions, making available 
a bespoke solution to meet the organisations requirements. Fees are levied against the 
services that are provided by the outsource partner, such as: 
 
• Certificate Authority functions. 
• Registration Authority processes. 
• Certificate Repositories. 
• Key Backup and Recovery Systems.  
 65
• Non-repudiation services. 
• Time Stamping Services. 
• Directory Services. 
 
These services can be quickly implemented as outsourcers are geared towards 
providing primary critical components such as the RA, CA etc. Secondary services 
can also be provided such as policies, procedures, guidelines etc.  
 
Outsourcing PKI can offer the flexibility, scalability and reliability that an in house 
solution can’t.[85] Outsource providers are well placed to meet those demands. PKI 
requirements grow from the initial pilot scheme of small numbers of user accessing 
secure applications to a fully rolled out, high volume PKI system. Providers have 
strategic plans in place for growth of PKI systems, and are well versed the 
requirements to scale the system according to the customers needs.  
 
Having an outsource provider sign the certificates that the organisation issues with its 
own root certificate ensures that the certificates are seen as reliable, but more 
importantly they have a high level of trust associated with them. 
3.8. Disadvantages of Outsourcing PKI 
It has been suggested in studies that between 20% to 35% of all IT Outsourcing 
contracts are not renew after expiration.[86] There are some serious disadvantages to 
outsourcing a PKI solution [87], a selection of these are listed below:  
 
• Building Trust Relationships 
• Defining Multiple Legal Relationships 
• Roaming and Usability of the PKI System 
• Private Key Management  
• Certificate Distribution and Revocation 
• Legacy System Migration 
 
PKI doesn’t provide the answer to creating trust. Building trust requires more that just 
the issuance of certificates, there has to be guarantees put in place. Methods for 
building trust in a PKI have already been discussed in Section 2.17 of this document. 
 66
Even with risk assessments, contracts, audits and other “business methods” trust has 
to be won.  It is only through a long standing relationship and stringent processes that 
an organisation will trust it’s outsource partner. It may be the case through business 
necessity that there will be various levels of trust associated with certification, the 
amount of trust placed in an outsource partner normally hinges on judgement.  
 
“An impediment to the adoption of PKI has been the legal complexity and novelty 
traditionally associated with PKI.”[88] There are many legal ambiguities associated 
with PKI. For instance, In 2000 Australia’s National Office for the Information 
Economy (NEAC) published a report the “Legal Liability in E-Transactions” [89] 
found that, in general, Australian law provided an adequate level of guidance on the 
apportion of liability.  
 
There is however an exception in that there is no legal basis for liability in the 
relationship between the CA and the Relying Party (RP). This is compounded by the 
lack of provisions under private law to allocate liability between the CA and the RP. 
The Australian case is relevant as along with the US, and much of Europe the laws are 
technologically neutral and require more research and refinement in terms of the 
apportion of liability.  
 
Some of the problems with roaming and usability of PKI systems emerge from the use 
of soft certificates. These allow users to have their private keys stored on a central 
server and uploaded to their terminal when required. [90] This technology allows a 
roaming capability by allowing the user to move from one terminal to another without 
the need to manually export their private keys. This also enhances usability of the 
system.  
 
However, the roaming of soft certificates provides an attacker with the option of 
eaves-dropping the central server in order to recover cryptographic keying material. It 
can be a costly in terms of money and manpower to ensure that the risks soft 
certificates present to the business are managed effectively.  
 
 
 
 67
Key Management problems, certificate issuance and revocation, and legacy system 
migration are all well known problems in PKI. Outsourcing PKI does not get rid of 
these problems, it can make the system easy to manage but the organisation has to 
ensure good governance and management of the outsource provider and the selected 
solution in order to overcome these problems.  
3.9. Multi-sourcing Strategies  
“Multi-sourcing: the disciplined provisioning and blending of business and IT 
services from the optimal set of internal and external providers in the pursuit 
of business goals.”[91]  
 
A multi-sourced PKI solution is optimized to meet the needs of the organisation. 
Outsourcing can mean that sometimes the organisation has to relinquish sole control 
of its outsourced functionality. In terms the importance of and organisations 
information assets the best option may not be an outsourced solution but a multi-
sourced solution. This ensures that the organisation’s information assets that it wants 
to retain control off can be kept “in house”.  
 
Multi-sourcing is seen as a step beyond outsourcing as it provides more agility and 
capability by using various providers to enable the addition of new and versatile 
frameworks for managing functionality from providers both inside and outside of the 
organisations core disciplines.  For Multi-sourcing to be successful organisations have 
to look beyond the quick-fix options of traditional outsourcing and look the “creation 
of a sourcing strategy that is tightly linked to the overall business strategy and 
constantly monitored by an effective enterprise-wide governance system.”[92] 
 
When building a multi-sourcing strategy it is important that the business objectives 
are clearly defined, it is often clear that organisations from the very start of the 
process are not clear on the objectives that they wish to achieve. The objectives are 
normally either over-specified leading to micro management or an unworkable 
solution to under-specified leaving the provider to have carte blanche when designing 
the solution which normally fails to meet the organisations original objectives. The 
next stage in the strategy is to ensure that the organisation gets maximum value for 
their investment either from an internal or external provider, to do this the 
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organisation has to factor in including how much is the solution going to cost and are 
there going to be efficiency gains that make the sourcing of the functionality worth 
while.  
 
The organisation has to deal with issues of integration if the functionality is sourced 
internally will it be easier to integrate the required systems and services than it would 
if the functionality was sourced from an external provider. Finally, how does the 
organisation govern and manage relationships in a multi-sourced environment it 
appears that it would be easier to implement internally sourced functionality as the 
policies, procedures, guidelines etc are already in place for existing staff but it could 
prove more difficult for externally sourced functionality, it has already been 
mentioned that there is a need for an effective enterprise-wide governance system 
which could prove costly. 
 
Multi-sourcing as well as outsourcing can have many advantages and disadvantages 
for an organisation, cost, competitive edge and external expertise all combine to 
provide the organisation with the tool to concentrate on core business and remain 
competitive in the market place. Multi-sourcing takes this one stage further and 
promotes sourcing of functionality both internally and externally to provide the best 
possible solution to meet the business objectives of the organisation.  
 
In terms of PKI, this approach if adopted could prove to be the optimum model for a 
sourced solution allowing the organisation to source internally the functionality that 
will retain the confidentiality, integrity and availability of its core assets whilst 
externally sourcing the functionality that it is not capable of providing internally 
either due to cost restrictions or lack of skilled personnel. 
3.10. Summary 
To meet the stated objectives I have defined the basic principles of Outsourcing, the 
history of outsourcing is explored to determine why organisations outsource and the 
various reasons that are used to measure the benefits of outsourcing such as 
organisationally driven, improvement driven and financially driven reasons. There is a 
brief introduction to the methodology of security engineering in outsourcing. The 
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SSE-CMM model outlines the risk, engineering and assurance processes required 
when dealing with the outsourcing of PKI.  
 
There is a section that looks at governing and managing outsourcing - this is a brief 
description of governance and how it applies to outsourcing and the relationship 
management aspect of outsourcing along with the advantages and disadvantages of 
outsourcing. The final section deals with multi-sourcing - this is the new thinking of 
outsourcing which provides a more flexible solution by combining internal and 
external processes in an apparent seamless match which are closely managed and 
governed to provide the optimum degree of efficiency. 
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4. Proposed Model for Outsourcing PKI 
This chapter describes our own model for Outsourcing PKI, various models, both of 
the authors own designs and existing models, to provide a modeled solution to 
outsourcing PKI. The models detailed in this chapter are: 
 
• The Enterprise Security Architecture will be based on the Sherwood Applied 
Business Security Architecture (SABSA).[93] 
• Our AB-5C model based on organisational checklists, which will determine 
core service requirements, enabled services requirements, deployment 
considerations, operational considerations, information dissemination 
requirements and trust model deployment and considerations. 
• Aligning outsourcing with the organisation’s strategic plan, the “Seven-S 
Model” [94] developed by McKinsey & Company in the 1970s is used to 
analyze the organisation’s effectiveness and help the organisation plan for and 
cope with the change of outsourcing PKI.   
• Continuity management will be based on ITIL Service Continuity Model [95] 
which is designed to support the business continuity management functions of 
an organisation and ensure that the services disrupted can be recovered within 
an agreed timeframe. Following on from the continuity management are our 
own incident management flowcharts both for incident handling and post 
incident review.  
• Change management modeling is done through a PA Consulting framework 
for outsourcing and outsourced enabled change.[96] This model is only briefly 
explained and added to show the importance of having an effective and 
efficient change management scheme as part of the overall outsourcing 
activity. 
• The final section brings together these models into the author’s own model 
(AB-5C Model), detailing a common operating environment where 
organisation’s cultures and strategic aims are aligned based on the results of 
the activities explained in this chapter.  
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4.1. Introduction 
Organisation’s have their own methods of selecting which processes and services 
have to be retained in-house and which have to be outsourced, this is no different for 
PKI. This process normally involves alignment of the strategy and the wider business 
goals and objectives to that of the outsource partner. Modelling PKI outsourcing is a 
complex task and in this section we propose our model (AB-5C Model) that will give 
organisation’s a tool to outsource PKI in a structured way relevant to the 
organisations business needs. 
4.2. Proposed Model 
The model we are proposing deals with both business requirements and the 
technology of outsourcing PKI. The AB-5C Model of Outsourcing PKI is a 
qualitative approach to helping the organisation make the right decisions when 
choosing to outsource PKI. This in turn can achieve a reduction in costs, access to 
resources and services that it cannot provide for internally, but at the same time retain 
flexibility and innovation through outsourcing functional elements of the 
organisation’s PKI.   
4.3. The AB-5C Model of PKI Outsourcing  
Our AB5C Model is designed to assist organisations in its PKI outsourcing activities. 
It is a method of analyzing aspects of selecting and defining an outsourced PKI 
solution. The parts of the AB-5C Model are: 
 
• (A) - Adding Value to the Organisation 
• (B) - Business Strategy 
• (5C) - Competencies, Conditions, Culture, Continuity and Change 
 
The model we propose defines the importance of adding value to the organisation, 
details the strategy that the organisation uses when planning an outsourced PKI, and 
defines a set of variables that have to be met by any outsource provider. All of these 
concepts are explained clearly in this section.  
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4.4. Adding Value to the Organisation –Business Goals and Objectives  
Outsourcing has to add value to the organisation, it has to meet the business goals and 
objectives laid out by senior management and it has to ensure that it is the best 
decision for the organisation, not purely a cost cutting exercise.  In adding value to the 
organisation the CEO and board have to ensure that the correct level of investment is 
set to meet the business goals and objectives. 
 
 If a full PKI rollout is required then the management have to be sure that the correct 
level of management buy-in is available. This buy-in is required, not just during the 
implementation of the system, but also in its running, maintenance and as the system 
adapts when functionality requirements change. The executive have to understand that 
the level of expertise required for a PKI system covers many disciplines and as such it 
they must have all of the secondary processes in place to meet the business goals and 
objectives, such as audit and training and awareness programmes.  
 
To ensure that the goals and objectives of the organisation are met there has to be 
policies that are followed; these have to be specific so that there is no confusion about 
the requirements of the system in meeting strategic objectives of the organisation.  
The key aim is to be precise in the requirement and not deviate from the original goal. 
There have to be procedures put in place to continually measure the effectiveness of 
the system in meeting the goals and objectives of the organisation. As new goals and 
objectives are added then the system has to be measured to ensure that it is still adding 
value to the organisation.  
 
The organisation has to be realistic in what a PKI system can do in meeting its 
business goals and objectives. PKI is a technology solution in support of the business 
but can also be seen as a business tool. What it is not is a quick fix that is 
implemented just because the technology is available. It has to be implemented in 
support of the organisation and relevant to the organisation. Finally, the timeframe in 
which the goals and objectives have to be achieved by the utilisation of a PKI system 
has to be realistic, there has to be adequate time for the design lifecycle to be 
completed with the associated testing and re-adjustments to take place. As with any 
new system this can take a significant amount of time and thus the expectations in 
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terms of meeting the goals and objectives of an organisation within a given timeframe 
have to be realistic. 
4.5. Business Strategy – Aligning Outsourcing with Strategic Planning  
Strategic planning is not a solitary discipline and has to be looked at from different 
views in order to understand the processes and consequences of long term decision 
making for the organisation. There are four common views to look at: “the futurity of 
current decisions, process, philosophy and structure.”[97]  
 
Firstly, the futurity of current decisions looks at the cause and effect of decisions over 
a pre-agreed period of time, allowing management to adjust the planning 
considerations accordingly and factor in any alternatives that may need to be 
considered. In terms of outsourcing the futurity of current decisions has to take into 
account the changing needs of the organisation and ensure that the management of the 
outsource agreement can be flexible enough that if the initial planning is flawed then 
alternatives can be put in place to correct initial planning decisions and the 
organisation doesn’t suffer as a consequence.  
 
Secondly, the process view starts with the setting of the organisations aims and 
objectives and defines the processes, policies, guidelines, strategies etc to support the 
achievement of those aims and objectives. The process view takes into account the 
time period of the strategic plan, how it is to be implemented and what results will be 
achieved. This will result in a set of strategic plans that will form the basis of a 
continual planning processing phase which will enable the organisation to meet the 
continually changing and demanding requirements of their core business. As with any 
technological solution, PKI has to have a strict set of project plans and guidelines that 
allow for the implementation processes to be followed, measured and changed when 
and if required.  
 
The third, philosophical view is not a strict process driven view but a thought driven 
process that guides decision making. In the case of PKI the organisation, both 
management and staff, have to believe that it is the right decision for the future of the 
organisation or the implementation will fail to be fully accepted within the 
organisation and thus fail. The final view is the structure view is a more formalized 
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strategic planning system and takes into account the main types of organisational 
strategic planning, these being, operational planning, short-term budgetary planning 
and medium range program planning as well as the organisations overall strategic 
planning processes.  
 
The final view is the structural view.  Strategic planning can follow various models 
such as centralized, de-centralized and devolved structures with each of the 
organisational strategic planning streams coming together to form the overall 
organisation’s strategic plan. The strategic planning structure can have a huge impact 
on the adoption of a PKI as each constituent part, if following the organisational 
models, needs stakeholders from each of the work streams to ensure that any 
implementation is managed correctly and provides each of the management streams 
with the system that meets all of their own and the organisation’s goals and objectives 
in line with both tactical and strategic plans. 
4.6. Competencies - Defining an Enterprise Security Architecture  
A model for measuring competencies can be based on the Sherwood Applied 
Business Security Architecture (SABSA) which itself is based on the Zachman 
Framework.[98] “SABSA is a model and a methodology for developing risk-driven 
enterprise information security architectures.”[99] SABSA is characterised by the fact 
that all decisions are derived by analysing the business requirements for security of an 
organisation This methodology makes the SABSA model very desirable when 
defining an Enterprise Security Architecture for Outsourcing PKI both for the 
organisation, its outsource partner and the alignment of the organisations 
competencies.  
4.6.1. SABSA Operational Security Architecture 
The SABSA Operational Security Architecture is based on a six layer model which is 
the basis of a process led methodology for creating security architectures. In Figure 14 
the model is shown with the operational security architecture spanning the other five 
architectures. The reason for this is that operational security issues occur at each of 
these five layers and have to be addressed throughout. Figure 14,[100] shows the 
SABSA Model for Security Architecture Development with Table 8, [101] a brief 
overview of each layer. 
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Figure 14: SABSA Model for Security Architecture Development 
 
 
Layer Description 
At the Contextual Layer Business policymaking, business risk assessment 
process, business requirements collection and 
specification, organisational and cultural development, 
etc. 
At the Conceptual Layer Major programmes for training and awareness, business 
continuity management, audit and review, process 
development for registration, authorisation, 
administration and incident handling, development of 
standards and procedures, etc. 
At the Logical Layer Security policymaking, information and classification, 
systems classification, management of security services, 
security of service management, negotiation and 
interoperability standards for security services, audit 
trail and monitoring  and innovation of actions, etc.  
At the Physical Layer Development and execution of security rules, practices 
and procedures, including: cryptographic key 
management, communication of security parameters 
between parties, synchronisation between parties; 
ACL’s (Access Control List) maintenance and 
distribution of ACEs ( Access Control Entry), backup 
management (storing, labelling, indexing, etc), virus 
pattern search maintenance, event log management and 
archiving, etc.  
At the Component Layer Products, technology, evaluation and selection of 
standards and tools, project management, 
implementation management, operation and 
administration of individual components, etc. 
 
Table 9: SABSA Operational Security Architecture 
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4.6.2. Contextual Layer - Security Architecture  
The contextual layer which is considered the be the layer that expresses the business 
view in which there is analysis of the context in which the system will be used, the 
business has to know how the system will meet the business goals and objectives and 
it is the businesses responsibility to answer these questions and provide the best 
solution to meet the business goals and objectives.  
 
In the case of PKI the type questions that the business will have to ask itself are how, 
when, where, why and by whom will the system be used and how will it meet the 
strategic goals and objectives of the organisation. The contextual layer will also 
include the creation of the organisations policies, procedures, guidelines along with 
the risk assessment process. The system requirements will be developed at this layer 
along with the specifications and any other business orientated process that will 
ensure that the developed system will meet the business requirements of the 
organisation.  
4.6.3. Conceptual Layer - Security Architecture 
The Conceptual layer is the architect’s view of the system is the architect’s concept of 
how the organisations goals and objectives will be met by the security architecture. It 
is also a strategic view of how all the work streams involved in the system will come 
together to provide the final solution along with the high level requirements and 
design decisions.  
 
In terms of PKI the conceptual layer will provide the high level strategies that will 
allow the system to meet the organisations objectives by ensuring that the system as a 
concept is clearly and suitably defined and is relevant to the organisation. Additional 
strategies that can be defined at this layer are training and awareness, business 
continuity planning with incident handling, internal and external audit procedures 
along with the further development of standards, policies, procedures and guidelines. 
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4.6.4. Logical Layer - Security Architecture 
The logical layer which is considered to be the designer’s view where the designer 
takes the higher level conceptual ideas and converts them into realistic structures that 
can be implemented in a real world environment. In this layer the designer carries out 
the systems engineering activities and details the overall system, the sub systems and 
constituent parts into a logical framework. 
 
 “The logical security architecture should reflect and represent all of the 
major security strategies in the conceptual security architecture. At this 
logical level, everything from the higher layers is transformed into a series of 
logical abstractions.”[102]  
 
In terms of PKI this layer is concerned with securing the logical representation of the 
real world business information and specifying all of the policy requirements to 
protect this information. It is the layer where the security services that PKI provide fit 
together to establish the logical services that enable the implementation of the PKI 
system.  
4.6.5. Physical Layer - Security Architecture 
The Physical Layer, known as the builders’ view where the conceptual views of the 
architect that have been translated into logical design by the designer are interpreted 
by the builder who turns the logical designs into a physical security architecture and 
technology model. This layer concerns itself with the: 
 
“Development and execution of security rules, practices and procedures, 
including: cryptographic key management, communication of security 
parameters between parties, synchronisation between parties; ACLs (Access 
Control List) maintenance and distribution of ACEs ( Access Control Entry), 
backup management (storing, labelling, indexing, etc), virus pattern search 
maintenance, event log management and archiving, etc.”[103]  
 
In terms of PKI this is where the security services and mechanisms as described in 
Section 2 are defined and turned from logical plans into physical assets, this layer 
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deals with the actual details of the specifications of how the system will be put 
together and ultimately operate.  
4.6.6. Component Layer - Security Architecture 
The component layer is the tradesman’s view, after the designer has finalised all of 
the specifications of the system it is necessary to assemble a team of “tradesmen” i.e. 
all the individuals necessary to build, implement and manage the process, in other 
words the project team. 
 
 Each member of the team will be responsible for their own speciality and are 
required to ensure that the system is build in accordance with higher layer instructions 
from the builders and the architects. They are also responsible for compliance with the 
specifications and any policies, procedures or guidelines to produce the system that 
complies with the overall plan to build and implement a secure system.  
 
In PKI this could mean that the system is built from scratch or that the designer has 
decided that architecture that is already in place can be used to implement the system, 
with the tradesmen customizing the hardware and software that is currently installed 
within the organisation  
4.6.7. Operational Security Architecture 
The operational security layer, also known as the facilities management view, 
encompasses all of the five layers in the security architecture. The facilities manager 
is the person who is responsible for the day to day operation of the system - one 
method of managing the system is through an Information Security Management 
System (ISMS), as defined in ISO/IEC 27001,[104] by using the Plan, Do, Check, Act 
Cycle (PDCA). The facilities manager can ensure that there is continuity of operations 
whilst managing the risks and adapting the controls that are put in place that affect the 
security of the system. 
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4.7. Conditions – Modelling Outsourcing based on PKI Requirements  
This section will look at modelling organisational outsourcing based on the 
requirements of the PKI within the organisation, it will take a qualitative approach 
and it will form the basis of the model by being an integral part of the common 
operating environment between the organisation and the outsource partner.  
 
The specifications are developed by a composite project team consisting of members 
of both the organisation and the outsource partner but there will also be a strict 
governance hierarchy in place to oversee the work of the project team both to ensure 
that the outsource partner can provide the PKI requirements of the organisation, and 
also that the organisation is meeting its strategic goals and objectives by having the 
correct implementation of the PKI for their business needs.  
4.7.1. Methodology for Qualitative Analysis of Conditions 
This section will describe the overall methodological approach used in determining 
the conditions for outsourcing PKI. Qualitative analysis will be carried out on the 
following conditions for modelling organisational outsourcing based on the 
organisation’s PKI requirements. 
 
• PKI Core Services 
• PKI Enabled Services 
• PKI Application Enablers 
• PKI Business Drivers 
• PKI Supplier Provisions 
• PKI Deployment Considerations 
• PKI Operational Considerations 
• PKI Information Dissemination 
• PKI Trust Models 
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We propose a theoretical model (Figure 15) which will provide organisation’s with 
criteria in order to qualitatively assess each of the above conditions. This model will 
allow the composite project team from the organisation and outsource provider to 
determine the ability of the business to meet their goals and objectives with regard to 
PKI.  
 
Each condition is graded Low, Medium or High with a base score attached to each: 
 
• Low (Base Score 0.0-3.9) – The condition is not required to meet the business 
goals and objectives. 
• Medium (Base Score 4.0-6.9) – The condition is not required but may assist in 
meeting the business goals and objectives. 
• High (Base Score 7.0-10) – The condition is a mandatory requirement in 
meeting the business goals and objectives. 
 
The composite project team assign the qualitative value for each of the conditions 
depending on the extent to which: 
 
• The condition adds value to the organisation 
• The condition is aligned with the organisations business strategy.  
• The condition meets the competencies required by the organisation. 
• The condition meets other requirements laid out by the organisation. 
• The condition is in cultural alignment with the organisation and the outsource 
provider. 
• The condition provides for continuity of operations 
• The condition allows for the organisation to retain management control during 
periods of change.  
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Figure 15: Theoretical Model for Qualitative Assessment 
 
After the initial Low, Medium or High grade has been assigned the capability for each 
condition is then assigned a base score and the conditions are plotted on a graph (See 
Figure 16). 
 
This process gives the composite project further detail in which to support the 
analysis of the most suitable condition in meeting the organisations goals and 
objectives. Section 4.72 will be used as an example of how the tables are completed. 
It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to go into the details of the decision making 
process, it will however, provide the reader with an idea how to complete the tables.. 
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4.7.2. PKI Core Services 
PKI is normally associated with three core services: [105] 
 
• Confidentiality 
• Integrity 
• Authentication 
 
Each of these core services have been defined in Section 2.12 of this document. As 
mentioned Privacy and Confidentiality are synonymous with each other, 
confidentiality is the assurance of data privacy. In this case the assurance of data and 
privacy are methods other than symmetric cryptography such as physical protection 
etc.   
 
In terms of this model Integrity mechanisms that will give assurance of non-alteration 
for data considered to be either in transit or storage will encompass cyclic redundancy 
checks.  For integrity mechanisms that utilise public key cryptography, digital 
signature mechanisms will be used.  
 
Authentication mechanisms previously been explained. In terms of grading entity 
authentication will be treated as either, mutual and unilateral authentication and the 
grades awarded in those terms. Data origin, remote, local and single factor 
authentication are self explanatory and will be treated as single, though bearing in 
mind that one or more of the authentication mechanisms may be provided within 
other protocol runs. Multi-factor authentication will take into account that there are 
many ways in which to prove ones identity, in considering the grading the reader must 
determine which dual authentication methods they wish to use, for example: [106] 
 
• Something you have. (Smart token) 
• Something you know. (Password) 
• Something you are. (Biometric) 
 
 
 
 83
PKI Core Services Low Medium High 
Confidentiality 
Assurance of data Privacy    
Symmetric Cryptography    
Integrity 
Assurance of Non-Alteration     
Digital Signatures    
Authentication 
Entity Authentication     
Data Origin Authentication    
Remote Authentication    
Local Authentication     
Single Factor Authentication     
Multi-Factor Authentication    
 
Table 10: PKI Core Services 
 
Table 10 provides a List of PKI Core Services which provides a score card for the 
general qualitative value of Low, Medium or High. This is the first step in the 
modelling process; the grading gives the composite project team the high level 
overview to assist in the modelling of organisational outsourcing based on the 
requirements of the PKI. In this example: 
 
• Assurance of data privacy was rated high: 
o The key requirement of the organisation is to maintain the 
confidentiality of key business information. 
• Symmetric cryptography was rated high: 
o It was decided that symmetric cryptography should be used to encrypt 
the organisations data backups.  
• Assurance of Non Alteration was rated high: 
o Integrity Mechanisms such as MAC and HMAC used to ensure 
integrity of stored data.  
• Digital Signatures was rated high: 
o Selected as high to provide the organisation not only with integrity 
mechanisms but also the provision of non repudiation.  
• Entity Authentication was rated medium 
o The organisation operates in a closed environment, with few staff.  
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• Data Origin Authentication was rated medium 
o The use of digital signatures will provide for most of the data origin 
authentication requirements.  
• Remote Authentication was rated Low 
o As mentioned, the organisation is within a closed environment and 
there is no requirement for remote authentication.  
• Local Authentication was rated high 
o Local authentication is a high requirement as the user has to present his 
credentials to the local terminal in order to gain access to the system.  
• Single Factor Authentication was rated low. 
o The organisation considers this a weak notion of authentication..  
• Multi Factor Authentication was rated high 
o The business requires a multi factor authentication to include smart 
token and password to gain access to the system. 
 
Confidentiality                
Assurance of Data 
Privacy High High High High High High High 
Symmetric Cryptography High High High High High High High 
Integrity                
Assurance of Non-
Alteration High High High High High High High 
Digital Signatures Medium High High High High Low Low 
Authentication               
Entity Authentication High High High  High  High  High  High  
Data Origin 
Authentication Medium Medium High  High Medium  High High  
Remote Authentication Low Low Low  Low  Low  High High  
Local Authentication  Medium Medium Medium Medium Low Low  High 
Single Factor 
Authentication Low Low Low Low  Low  Low  Low  
Multifactor Authentication High High High High High  High  High 
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Table 11: PKI Core Services - Capability Matrix 
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The next step is to complete the PKI Core Services Capability Matrix. This is carried 
out by to assign the qualitative value of Low, Medium or High, to each of the 
conditions depending on the extent to which they meet the requirements. The grading 
system is: 
 
• Low – The condition is not required to meet the business goals and objectives. 
• Medium – The condition is not required but may assist in meeting the business 
goals and objectives. 
• High – The condition is required to meet the business goals and objectives. 
 
Assurance of Data 
Privacy 7.5 8.3 7.1 9.3 8.4 7.7 7.7 
Symmetric Cryptography 6.6 8.1 9.1 6.3 9.1 8.7 6.3 
Assurance of Non-
Alteration 7.1 9.8 8.7 7.8 7.2 7.78 8.1 
Digital Signatures 6.6 8.1 9.1 8.3 8.6 3.2 2.7 
Entity Authentication 7.5 8.3 7.1 9.3 8.4 7.7 7.7 
Data Origin 
Authentication 5.8 6.3 9.1 8.7 6.2 7.1 9.3 
Remote Authentication 3.8 2.1 2.7 1.9 3.4 9 8.7 
Local Authentication  4.7 6.1 5.3 5.7 0.7 1.1 7.1 
Single Factor 
Authentication 0.3 0.9 1.3 0.8 2.1 3.3 2.7 
Multifactor Authentication 7.9 8.4 7.6 9.3 9.4 7.8 8.1 
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Table 12: PKI Core Services - Base Score Matrix 
 
 
Table 12 shows the Base Score Matrix for PKI Core Services. This provides a more 
detailed analysis of the conditions depending on the extent to which they meet the 
requirements.  
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Each condition is graded with a Base Score, these are defined as: 
 
• Base Score 0.0-3.9 (Low) – The condition is not required to meet the business 
goals and objectives. 
• Base Score 4.0-6.9 (Medium) – The condition is not required but may assist in 
meeting the business goals and objectives. 
• Base Score 7.0-10 (High) – The condition is required to meet the business 
goals and objectives. 
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Figure 16: Graphical Representation of Base Scores 
 
 
Figure 16 is a graphical representation of the base scores assigned by the composite 
project team. This chart displays the Base Score of each condition in relation to the 
requirements of the qualitative assessment model (See Figure 15).   
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4.7.3. PKI Enabled Services 
There are ten PKI Enabled Services which are looked at in this section, this is by no 
means all of the services enabled by PKI but it does provide a broad view of the 
services available in order to grade each of the conditions. This section will briefly 
discuss each of the enabled services in turn and give an overview of the security 
services they provide. (See Table 13) 
 
PKI Enabled Services Low Medium High 
Secure E-Mail    
Secure Web Servers    
IPSec/IKE    
Non-Repudiation    
Authentication/Authorization    
Authorization Authorities    
Policy Servers    
Attributed Certificates    
Trusted Delivery Mechanisms    
Secure Protocols    
 
Table 13: PKI Enabled Services 
 
Secure E-Mail within PKI can be provided by S/MIME (Section 2.13.2) which is 
standardised in the IETF S/MIME working group through a series of RFCs. S/MIME 
provides the following security services:[107] 
 
• Authentication. 
• Message Integrity. 
• Non Repudiation of Origin (When using digital signatures.) 
• Privacy & Data Security using encryption. 
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The provision of Secure Web Services (Section 2.13.1) in PKI is realised by using 
SSL/TLS and HTTPS, both protocols require digital signatures to provide the 
following security services: 
 
• Data Privacy (Confidentiality) 
• Data Integrity 
 
IPSec/IKE was designed to provide interoperable and cryptographically based 
security services for IPv4 and IPv6. IPSec either uses or provides the following 
security services: 
 
• Data Confidentiality 
• Data Integrity 
• Data Origin Authentication 
• Access Control 
 
Non Repudiation (Section 2.13.5) enabled services provided by PKI include: 
 
• Non repudiation of origin. 
• Non repudiation of receipt. 
• Non repudiation of creation. 
• Non repudiation of delivery.  
 
Policy Servers, Attributed Certificates, Trust Delivery Mechanisms and Secure 
Protocols are all enabled by a PKI infrastructure those mechanisms provide the 
support for the security services offered by the PKI enabled services.  
 
Table 15 shows the Base Score Matrix for PKI Enabled Services. This provides a 
more detailed analysis of the conditions depending on the extent to which they meet 
the requirements. 
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Secure E-Mail               
Secure Web Servers               
IPSec/IKE               
Non-Repudiation               
Authentication / 
Authorization               
Authorization Authorities               
Policy Servers               
Attributed Certificates               
Trust Delivery Mechanisms               
Secure Protocols               
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Table 14: PKI Enabled Services - Capability Matrix 
 
4.7.4. PKI Application Enablers 
 
Application enablers provide a user friendly interface to the organisation’s 
information infrastructure. This section details a selection of PKI application enablers 
and gives brief descriptions of each along with some advantages and disadvantages to 
assist in the grading of these conditions.  
 
 
Application Enabler Low Medium High 
Secure Sign-On    
End User Transparency    
Comprehensive Security    
Application Layer Proxies    
 
Table 15: PKI Application Enablers 
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A secure sign on system provides an organisation with a scalable enterprise 
authentication solution. Authentication information is securely passed between 
systems that the user has permission to access. The obvious benefit to this is that the 
user doesn’t have to remember numerous passwords for different systems. This takes 
away the temptation for the employee to put the sticky with the password under their 
keyboard.  
 
The other benefit is that eavesdroppers on the network will be limited to sniffing the 
user’s LAN. After the initial authentication, secure protocols are used to pass the 
authentication information to other systems. The main disadvantage is that if an 
attacker has access to the authentication credentials then they will have access to all of 
the systems the user is privy to.   
 
End User Transparency means that the user requires no knowledge of the underlying 
infrastructure. In terms of a PKI solution all of the security services should be hidden 
from the user. The system should be seen to function seamlessly without the need for 
the user to interact with the security functionality of the system. There are obvious 
exceptions to this rule, one being that if the user is required to be presented with any 
special security information when logging into a system. 
 
Comprehensive Security is the provision of a “pervasive substrate” on which security 
applications can work together to provide a seamless security solution. This can prove 
to be difficult to integrate and manage but if successful a comprehensive security 
infrastructure supported by PKI would be very effective.   
 
Application Layer Proxies are used to protect against malicious attacks, and are 
widely seen as the best choice when the organisation has allowed access to the 
internet for its users. The reason it is popular is because application layer proxies are 
normally used on a limited set of internet protocols such as HTTP, FTP and 
SMTP.[180] The application layer proxy acts as a relay for application level traffic, 
when the user wants to access a service, the proxy is alerted and opens a pseudo 
application for the request. The request is then passed to the gateway and it is either 
authorized or rejected based on the protocol and policy. The advantage of this proxy 
is that it can limit the internet activities of users by only allowing a strict set of 
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protocols which are closely monitored. The disadvantages of the proxies is that it can 
put a large processing overhead on the system, like all security activities it is a 
balancing act between security and usability.  
 
Table 16 shows the Base Score Matrix for PKI Application Enablers. This provides a 
more detailed analysis of the conditions depending on the extent to which they meet 
the requirements.  
 
Secure Sign-On               
End User Transparency               
Comprehensive Security               
Application Layer Proxies               
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Table 16: PKI Application Enablers - Capability Matrix 
 
4.7.5. Outsourced PKI Business Drivers 
There are many drivers that have the attributes to be able to describe them as PKI 
Business Drivers. The analysis of business drivers for PKI is far beyond the scope of 
this dissertation, though, some common drivers are listed in Table 17. These have 
been selected as in our view provide a high level overview of the business drivers 
behind PKI.  
 
Cost savings are described in more detail in Section 3.3. Cost driven reasons for 
outsourcing PKI include reducing operational costs through superior outsource 
partner performance and the ability of the partner to provide a lower cost structure. 
This in turn will turn the fixed costs to the organisation of operating its own PKI, into 
variable costs, allowing the business to save on the initial start up costs and save on 
the management of the system.   
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The interoperability of a PKI system into an organisation is a multi faceted problem 
comprises of both technical and non-management issues.  For PKI systems, sub 
systems and applications to work together its interfaces must conform to technical 
standards. As businesses deploy PKI to support their core business processes the 
organisation has to take into account interoperability with external partners.  
 
Business to business (B2B) applications will require interoperability of PKIs, these 
may have been implemented on different architectures, work to different policies or 
use varying cryptographic protocols. Interoperability is an important issue that has to 
be addressed early in the process of defining the PKI architecture. A strong driver for 
a business to adopt a PKI is to provide a comprehensive security system. This is the 
provision of a “pervasive substrate” on which security applications can work together 
to provide a seamless security solution.  
 
PKI can assist an organisation with emerging business opportunities. As organisations 
become more security aware the expectation that their business partners provide solid 
security practices, assurance of good governance and compliance is ever more 
important. Having a solid PKI in place, either in house or outsourced, can provide an 
organisation with a sound basis for the pursuit of a comprehensive security solution. 
This gives prospective clients or business partners the confidence that the organisation 
takes the security of their information seriously.   
 
Offering Identity Driven Management solutions is becoming more all-encompassing 
as organisations face the challenge of providing secure user access to systems and 
applications.[109] Identity Management solutions help in the provision of business 
issues such as: 
 
• Remote Access 
• Secure Sign-on  
• Photo ID Card Solutions 
 
A complete Identity Management solution that is trusted by business partners can 
deliver increased security, reduction in cost and user convenience.  
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Business Drivers Low Medium High 
Cost Savings    
Interoperability    
Inter-Enterprise     
Uniform Solution    
Comprehensive Security    
Internal Business 
Transformation 
   
Efficiency     
Technology Innovations    
Emerging Business 
Opportunities 
   
Identity Driven Management    
 
Table 17: PKI Business Drivers 
 
Table 18 shows the Base Score Matrix for PKI Business Drivers. This provides a 
more detailed analysis of the conditions depending on the extent to which they meet 
the requirements.  
 
Table 18: PKI Business Drivers - Capability Matrix 
 
Cost Savings               
Interoperability               
Inter-Enterprise               
Uniform Solution               
Possibility of achieving 
full security               
Internal Business 
Transformation               
Efficiency               
Technology Innovations               
Emerging Business 
Opportunities               
Identity Management               
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4.7.6. PKI Supplier Provisions 
The requirement of supplier provisions is a decision that has to be agreed by both the 
organisation and the outsource partner. Table 19 lists twenty two supplier provisions 
that the organisation may require the outsource partner to provide, describing in detail 
all of these provisions is beyond the scope of this dissertation. This list is based on our 
own opinion and experience, and it is by no means comprehensive.  
 
The outsource partner may well be able to fulfil all of the supplier provisions, but it 
may not be in the best interest of the organisation to source all of their needs from one 
supplier. There are other factors to take into account when dealing with suppliers and 
these will require other areas of the business to get involved such as procurement and 
legal to ensure that the organisation’s governance structure is not compromised and, 
in the case of cryptographic hardware for example, that all of the legal matters 
regarding liability etc. are covered before entering into any agreement.  
 
Supplier Provisions Low Medium High 
Cryptographic Hardware for 
Certificate signing 
   
Root Key Protection    
User Key Management    
Dual Key Support    
Key/Certificate Revocation    
Ease of Integration     
Use of Standard or Proprietary PKI    
Directory Technology Used    
Database Technology Used    
Availability and Scalability    
Built in Redundancy     
Disaster Recovery    
Security Management     
Risk Management     
Facility Security    
Personnel Security    
Independent Audit    
Non-Repudiation    
Dedicated Staff    
State of the art skill set    
Cross Certification    
 
Table 19: PKI Supplier Provisions 
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Table 20 shows the Base Score Matrix for PKI Supplier Provisions. This provides a 
more detailed analysis of the conditions depending on the extent to which they meet 
the requirements.  
 
 
Cyptographic 
Hardware for 
Certificate signing               
Root Key Protection               
User Key Management               
Dual Key Support               
Key/Certificate 
Revocation               
Ease of Integration                
Use of Standard or 
Proprietary PKI               
Directory Technology 
Used               
Database Technology 
Used               
Availability and 
Scalability               
Built in Redundancy                
Disaster Recovery               
Security Management                
Risk Management                
Facility Security               
Personnel Security               
Independent Audit               
Non-Repudiation               
Dedicated Staff               
State of the art skill set               
Cross Certification               
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Table 20: PKI Supplier Provisions - Capability Matrix 
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4.7.7. PKI Deployment Considerations 
There are twenty six deployment considerations list in Table 21. As with PKI business 
drivers this is not a comprehensive list and is solely based on our own opinions and 
experience. It may be the case that the outsource partner has more experience and is 
able to provide the expertise required to ensure that the organisation meets it strategic 
goals and objectives. Table 14 is a sample of some of the deployment considerations, 
and, as with all of the conditions in this section, it is a qualitative approach that is 
taken by the composite project team to ensure the correct decisions are made.  
 
Deployment Considerations Low Medium High 
Selection of Trust Model    
In-House or Outsource    
Build or Buy      
Closed Vs Open Environment     
X.509 Vs Alternative Certificate    
Targeted Applications     
Comprehensive Solutions     
Standard Solutions    
Proprietary Solutions    
Interoperability Considerations    
Peripheral Support     
Facility Requirements     
Personnel Requirements    
Certificate Revocation    
End Entity Roaming     
Key Recovery      
Repository Issues     
Disaster Planning and Recovery    
Security Assurance     
Mitigating Risk     
Lack of Industry Accepted 
Standard 
   
Multi-Vendor Operability    
Scalability and Performance    
Knowledgeable Personnel    
PKI Enabled Applications    
Corporate Level Acceptance    
 
Table 21: PKI Deployment Considerations 
 
Table 22 shows the Base Score Matrix for PKI Deployment Considerations. This 
provides a more detailed analysis of the conditions depending on the extent to which 
they meet the requirements.  
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Selection of Trust 
Model               
In-House or Outsource               
Build or Buy                
Closed Vs Open 
Environment               
X.509 Vs Alternative 
Certificate               
Targeted Applications               
Comprehensive 
Solutions                
Standard Solutions               
Proprietary Solutions               
Interoperability 
Considerations               
Peripheral Support                
Facility Requirements                
Personnel 
Requirements               
Certificate Revocation               
End Entity Roaming                
Key Recovery                
Repository Issues                
Disaster Planning and 
Recovery               
Security Assurance                
Mitigating Risk                
Lack of Industry 
Accepted Standard               
Multi-Vendor 
Operability               
Scalability and 
Performance               
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Table 22: PKI Deployment Considerations - Capability Matrix 
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4.7.8. PKI Operational Considerations 
Table 23 lists sixteen PKI operational considerations, as with the previous two 
sections these considerations are our own opinion, based on our experience and by no 
means a comprehensive list. Operational considerations map to the physical layer of 
the SABSA model as the operational considerations are the components of a PKI 
system that allow it to function. As with all of the conditions it is a qualitative process 
decided by the composite project team to provide the organisation with the means to 
support its strategic goals and objectives whilst maintaining the management 
capability of the system by the organisation.  
 
Operational Considerations Low Medium High 
Time Stamp Servers    
Notarization Services    
Non-Repudiation Services    
Revocation Checking     
Key Life Cycle Management    
Certificate Policy 
Enforcement 
   
Restricting Network Access    
Secure Reinforced Rooms    
Installing Proper Access 
Control 
   
Hardware Security Modules    
Smart Cards and Tokens    
Biometric Authentication    
Multifactor Authentication    
Authentication    
Compromise of User Key    
Disaster Preparation and 
Recovery 
   
 
Table 23: PKI Operational Considerations 
 
 
Table 24 shows the Base Score Matrix for PKI Operational Considerations. This 
provides a more detailed analysis of the conditions depending on the extent to which 
they meet the requirements.  
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Table 24: PKI Operational Considerations - Capability Matrix 
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4.7.9. PKI Information Dissemination 
PKI Information Dissemination deals with key distribution, directories and directory 
access. Section 2.7.4 of this document has a detailed description of publication and 
repository technologies. This section can be seen as a continuation of operational 
considerations as these are the components that allow PKI to function and the same 
rules for operational considerations should apply with information dissemination 
techniques.  
 
Information Dissemination Low Medium High 
Hand Delivery      
Attached to E-mail     
LDAP       
X.500 DSA      
OCSP Responders     
DNS       
Web Servers      
FTP       
Corporate Database     
Direct Access Repository    
Border Repository     
Shared Repository     
Inter-domain replication    
 
Table 25: PKI Information Dissemination 
 
 
Table 26 shows the Base Score Matrix for PKI Information Dissemination. This 
provides a more detailed analysis of the conditions depending on the extent to which 
they meet the requirements.  
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Table 26: PKI Information Dissemination - Capability Matrix 
 
4.7.10. PKI Trust Models 
Employing the correct PKI Trust Models, Section 2.17 provides a detailed description 
of trust models. Implementing the correct trust model for the organisation and its core 
business is the key to a successful PKI. Trust models are required in order to build a 
large scale infrastructure, as it is practically impossible to carry out authentication of 
an entity without having trust - these models allow trust relationships to be formed 
between entities that may have had no previous relationship.  
 
The decision of which trust model is selected has to do with the size of the 
implementation, whether or not the implementation is inter or intra organisational and 
a whole host of other reasons, but most importantly it has to support the strategic 
goals and objectives of the organisation.  
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PKI Trust Models Low Medium High 
Strict Hierarchy of Certification    
Authorities      
Loose Hierarchy of 
Certification 
   
Certificate Authorities     
Policy Based Hierarchies    
Distributed Trust Architecture    
Four Corner Trust Model    
Web Model      
User Centric Trust     
 
Table 27: PKI Trust Models 
Table 28 shows the Base Score Matrix for PKI Trust Models. This provides a more 
detailed analysis of the conditions depending on the extent to which they meet the 
requirements.  
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Table 28: PKI Trust Models - Capability Matrix 
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4.8. Culture – Aligning Organisations for Strategic Partnership 
One of the most important aspects for an organisation in selecting an outsource 
partner is the culture of both of the organisations which have to be aligned. A 
corporate culture that is able to adapt encourages employees to work effectively to 
ensuring the ease transition during periods of change which is necessary for long term 
growth.  
4.8.1. The Seven-S Mode 
The Seven-S Model developed by McKinsey & Company in the 1970s was originally 
developed for comprehensively analyzing the culture and behaviour of organisations. 
The model is split into two parts the hard S’s which are strategy, structure and 
systems, which are the core business functions of the organisation and are “hard-
wired” into the organisation. The second part of the model is the soft S’s,  the skills, 
shared values, style and staff, that are more concepts that deal with people in the 
organisation, how they interact with one another, the skills they posses and the style in 
which they carry out their tasks. The Seven-S Model is shown in Figure 15.[110]  
 
 
 
Figure 17: The Seven S Model 
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4.8.2. Structure  
The organisation’s structure is normally one of three main models: centralised; 
decentralised; or, devolved management. The centralized model has a central top 
down structure where the responsibility lies within the central body of the 
organisation with activities being centrally controlled to avoid duplication of effort, to 
provide mutual support and to ensure efficient and economic use of all resources. The 
devolved model takes away a lot of the control from the central authority and gives 
the decision making capability to department managers who then report to a senior 
person in the organisation. This approach gives the managers more control over the 
management framework and can enable a close alignment of the business needs of the 
organisation.  
 
The decentralized model takes away the decision making from the central authority 
completely allowing individual managers to make decisions that effect the 
organisation directly; this allows the managers to develop their own strategies, 
policies etc depending on the area of the business, geographic location and any unique 
circumstances in which they may operate. All of the models have their pros and cons 
and each effect how the management framework is designed and delivered to the 
organisation but one of the most important things that all of these models have is they 
offer is the ability to apply strategic, tactical and operational initiatives depending on 
the size, culture and operational area of any given organisation when and where it is 
required.  
4.8.3. Strategy 
The organisation’s strategy is defined as: 
 
“The direction and scope of an organisation over the long term: which 
achieves advantage for the organisation through its configuration of resources 
within a challenging environment, to meet the needs of the markets and to 
fulfil stakeholder expectations.”[111] 
 
Different areas within the organisation will have developed their own strategies. 
There will be a corporate strategy that governs how the organisation will meet its 
goals and objectives, which may be driven by stakeholder expectations and, not 
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necessarily, what is best for the organisation. There is also a business work flow 
strategy which deals directly, in which the specific business unit operates and defines 
how the organisation interacts with its customers and providing its customers with the 
products which will maintain their competitive edge, thus, ensuring the organisations 
success.  
 
Finally there is the operational strategy, which is the strategy that will ensure that all 
of the business work flow strategies come together to meet the overall corporate 
strategy and deals with all of the resource and management issues within the wider 
organisation.  
4.8.4. System 
The organisation’s system defines the “procedures both formal and informal, by 
which an organisation operates and gathers information.”[112] the system also accounts 
for existing innovation within the organisation to create a culture of innovation. It is 
important that the whole system supports it, and this may mean that the culture of the 
organisation has to change to allow for individual innovation in support of the 
organisations growth.  
4.8.5. Shared Values 
The organisation’s shared values are the guiding concepts that normally are not part 
of the goals and objectives of the organisation but are the core ideas on which the 
organisation was founded. Shared values are fundamental in forming the principles 
that allow everyone in the organisation to feel as if they are working towards the 
greater good, gives them a sense of belonging to an organisation which projects from 
them the ideals of the organisation. Shared values are the foundation blocks of the 
organisations culture.  
4.8.6. Skills 
The skills that are present in the organisation’s staff are crucial to the success in 
meeting the goals and objectives of the organisation. Having the right people, with the 
right skills working on the right projects will provide successful results and having the 
wrong people will mean failure. Each organisation should focus on its core business 
as the skills of their staff lie in these areas. This is an important point for outsourcing 
PKI - one of the main reasons that organisations have to look elsewhere when 
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designing and implementing a PKI system is that internal staff does not have the 
specialized skill set required. 
4.8.7. Style  
The organisation’s style is:  
 
“The leadership approach of top management and the organisations overall 
operating approach; also the way in which the organisations employees 
present themselves to the outside world, to suppliers and customers.”[113]  
 
Every organisation has a different style and to some extent this defines an 
organisation to its customers and it can be instrumental in gaining new business but 
more importantly retaining already existing contracts.  
4.8.8. Staff 
The people who work in an organisation are its single most important asset, without 
dedicated, intelligent and skilled staff the business will fail. ‘Staff’ in this context also 
deals with all of the human resources issues such as recruitment, integration, training 
and continual career development which will allow the organisation to recruit, train 
and retain the best people possible to ensure the success of the organisation.  
4.9. Continuity – Ensuring Effective Continuity of Operations 
“Continuity management is the process by which plans are put in place and 
managed to ensure that IT Services can recover and continues should a serious 
incident occur. It is not just about reactive measures, but also about proactive 
measures – reducing the risk of disaster in the first instance.”[114]  
 
Ensuring that the organisation can recover quickly and effectively from any incident 
is paramount to its continued success - as customers want a continued service without 
interruptions every minute systems are down money is lost and reputation damaged. 
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4.9.1. ITIL Service Continuity 
The IT Infrastructure Library (ITIL) mission statement for IT Service continuity is to: 
 
“Support business continuity management functions by ensuring that IT services 
can be recovered in the event of a major business disruption within required 
timescales.”[115]  
 
The most critical aspect of the mission statement is that the IT services affected are 
recovered within the agreed timescales. This will have been defined in any contract 
between the organisation and the outsource provider. ITIL aims to achieve this by 
covering all of the major business functions of the organisation with IT service 
continuity plans and ensuring that these plans are thoroughly audited and tested - from 
this it is possible to determine realistic timescales for recovery. ITIL lists key 
activities which are described in Table 29 below.[116]   
 
Key Activity Description 
Define the scope of IT Service 
Continuity Management. 
As with ISO/IEC 27001 the scope is defined in terms 
of the characteristics of the business, the 
organisation, the location, assets, technology with 
justifications.  
Conduct Business Impact Analysis. The business impact analysis will show how each 
part of the business will be affected by an incident 
and will cover both internal and external events. 
Conduct IT Risk Assessment. The IT Risk assessment will identify the assets 
within the scope of IT Service Continuity and 
identify the owners of the assets. It will identify the 
threats to the assets and the vulnerabilities that may 
be exploited by those threats, finally it will identify 
the impact on the assets if an incident occurs.  
Define IT Service Continuity Strategy 
in Line with Business Continuity 
Strategy 
This will involve aligning the IT service continuity 
which looks at the threats and analysis of the 
associated vulnerabilities to the Business Continuity 
Strategy which looks at the impact on the 
organisations business functions.  
Perform IT Service Continuity 
Organisation and Implementation 
Planning Activities. 
This must be a multi-disciplined approach with both 
technical and business managers involved to ensure 
that the all the stakeholders involved are aware of 
how IT Service Continuity is plan and implemented 
Implement Standby Arrangements and 
Risk Reduction Measures. 
The organisation has to have in place standby 
arrangements this will normally be done by having a 
contract in place with a standby provider 
Develop IT Recovery Plans and The organisation has to have the plans and 
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Procedures procedures in place to ensure that any incident does 
not result in the organisation not being able to 
recover within the timescales required.  
Perform Testing of IT Recovery Plans 
and Procedures. 
The disaster recovery team must test the continuity 
plan at regular intervals and use the results of the 
exercise to improve the existing plans and 
procedures.  
Review and Audit IT Recovery Plans 
and Procedures. 
The organisation has to undertake regular audits and 
reviews of the IT Recovery plans to ensure that the 
scope of the IT service continuity management 
remains adequate and that improvements are 
identified. 
Perform IT Service Continuity 
Educational Training and Awareness 
Activities. 
It is essential that the organisation has a training and 
awareness package in place to ensure that all of the 
staff in the organisation knows their roles and 
responsibilities in the event of an incident.  
Assess Impact of IT Changes on IT 
Service Continuity Plans and 
Processes. 
Any continuity plan or process has to be compatible 
with the existing IT infrastructure if the existing 
structure has to be changed then an impact analysis 
will have to take place with a change management 
process following.  
Validate Ongoing ability of IT Service 
Continuity Strategies to Meet Business 
Requirements. 
IT continuity is put in place primarily to ensure that 
the business meets its strategic goals and objectives. 
IT continuity management has to be continually 
reviewed to ensure that it always meets the business 
requirements of the organisation. 
Provide Management Information 
about IT Service Continuity 
Management Quality and Operations.  
Management have to be kept informed of the 
activities of the IT Service Continuity team but also 
have to provide the necessary resources to ensure 
that the plans and quality of operations are sufficient 
to overcome any incident that has been planned for.  
 
Table 29: ITIL Key Activities 
 
4.9.2. Incident Management 
We have designed two flowcharts for incident management processes. The first is the 
initial incident management flow process. This deals with the response of the 
organisation from the initial incident to the resumption of the system back to its 
normal state. 
 
The second process we have developed in the post incident review procedure. This 
deals with the review of the procedures taken during the incident and analyses the 
processes to ensure that they were carried out effectively and that any lessons learnt 
for the incident can be incorporated into the initial incident flow process.   
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Figure 18: Incident Management - Process Flow 
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Figure 19: Incident Management - Post Incident Review 
 
4.10. Change Management – Strategy for Technological Change in 
Outsourcing 
Change management activities are an important aspect to outsourcing, too often 
organisations have entered outsource partnerships and found that they have lost 
management control this often hinders the organisations ability to adapt to 
technological change and allow the organisation to continually meet its strategic goals 
and objectives. Having a change management specialist as part of the project team is 
essential in:  
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“Recognizing the risks associated with studying and implementing a 
transformation tool such as outsourcing and in assisting in creating an 
environment in which such an initiative can be successful.”[117]  
 
In a PA Consulting Sourcing Interest Groups New York Regional Meeting a 
framework for outsourcing and outsourced enabled changed was introduced, in the 
presentation one of the topics discussed was how often change occurs within an 
organisation.  
 
“The statistics are as follow: 89% of organisations make changes to their 
organisations with 65% changing their business processes, 78% implementing 
new IT Systems and 14% carrying out other change initiatives, if an 
organisation outsource key systems and then are unable to manage these 
systems then the core business of the organisation will suffer, affecting not 
only profitability but also the organisations reputation.”[118]  
 
Change Management is a key area where the organisation has to ensure that their 
selection of a strategic outsource partner allows for change to takes place seamlessly 
in order to continually meet the organisations goals and objectives. The model the PA 
Consulting proposed is shown in Figure 18.[119]  
 
 
Figure 20: Structured Change Framework 
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4.11. PKI Outsourced Model – Bringing the Pieces Together 
This section aims to bring each aspect of the model together to show the decision 
making process in a common operating environment shown in Figure 19, and 
describing how all aspects of this dissertation to combine and form the proposed PKI 
Outsourcing Model. 
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Figure 21: Modelling Organisational Outsourcing: Operating Environment 
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The common operating environment is built through aligning the organisation’s 
strategic goals and objectives with that of the outsource partner. It has been explained 
in the dissertation how an outsource partner has to be treated like a TTP. The rules 
and regulations that surround allowing a TTP access to the organisation’s most 
sensitive information are laid out both in ISO/IEC 17799[120] and ISO/IEC 14516.[121] 
The trust that is formed between the entities during this process is the basis for the 
common operating environment. Further to this, the alignment of the culture of both 
organisations is also extremely important and McKinsey & Companies Seven S 
Model is an extremely good tool for gauging an organisation’s culture and ensuring 
that both the outsource partner and the organisation have a cultural alignment.  
 
 
 
Figure 22: Proposed AB-5C PKI Outsourcing Model 
 
The proposed model brings all of the pieces of the jigsaw together to provide a model 
that fulfils the strategic goals and objectives of the organisation. The basis of the 
outsource relationship, as already discussed, is trust and an alignment of cultures 
between the organisation and the outsource partner. These are long term strategic 
partnerships and as such it is imperative that there is culture alignment and a solid 
base of trust between the two parties.  
 
In terms of the organisation the implementation of a PKI has to add value to the 
organisation, and, as discussed in Section 4.4 of this document, the business goals and 
objectives that will be supported by a PKI have to be laid out by senior management 
and using the technology solely because it is available will not support the 
organisations goals and objectives. The organisation’s business strategy and the 
alignment of any outsourcing activities with the strategic plan have to be thought out 
carefully. Section 4.5 of this document details the most common views associated 
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with strategic planning and outlines the importance of having a structure in place that 
can support the long term plans of the organisation.  
 
It has been mentioned in the previous section about the importance of the common 
operating environment to ensure an alignment of strategy and culture between the two 
organisations. The competencies of the outsource provider have to enable the 
organisation to meet its strategic goals and objectives - in this model the outsource 
provider has to have a cyclical process of competencies, conditions, continuity and 
change. A very effective model for measuring the competencies of an outsource 
provider is to use the SABSA Information Security Architecture to map the 
requirements of the organisation to the competencies of the outsource provider.  
 
With the SABSA Model the analysis of the business requirements to provide the 
security architecture are paramount and the operational security architecture provides 
a process led methodology for the creation of the security architecture. The five main 
layers of the SABSA model detail the roles and responsibilities within the 
organisational hierarchy from the business perspective to the facilities management, 
this model allows the organisation to map competencies against a recognized and 
widely used model to ensure the outsource provider has the correct competencies to 
allow the organisation to meet its strategic business goals and objectives.  
 
The conditions that are laid down for successful strategic partnership between the 
organisation and the outsource partner come from the decisions made by the 
composite project team. Representatives from both the organisation and the outsource 
provider make decisions concerning all of the aspects of a PKI design, and its 
implementation and management. These decisions are based on a qualitative approach 
with the experience of both parties taken into consideration when developing a system 
that is feasible, cost effective, what the client wants, what the outsource partner can 
provide but most importantly that it meets the goals and the objectives of the 
organisation.  
 
It is imperative that any outsource arrangement has effective continuity management 
which ensures that plans are put in place to recover services should an incident occur. 
It would be wise to use an existing, standardised method for doing this as it has been 
thoroughly tried and tested. ITIL provides a good system to enable organisations to 
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recover within an acceptable timescale either by countering the incident or using a 
standby partner to run the services, in the case of PKI this could include backup CAs, 
TA’s or any of the components associated with a PKI system. In association with 
continuity management is incident management, Figure 16 (Incident Management – 
Process Flow) and Figure 17 (Incident Management – Post Incident Review) need 
little explanation as they detail the decision trees for both incident handling and post 
incident review. Change management is critical in the success of an outsourced PKI 
implementation, management control is often lost when outsource agreements are 
signed and this limits the organisations ability meets its strategic goals and objectives 
in a rapidly changing technological, legal and regulatory environment. 
4.12. Summary 
In summary, this section introduced the concepts surrounding our new model (AB-
5C) for an organisation to outsource PKI. The model looks at ensuring that the 
organisation adds value to the business and meets the existing goals and objectives of 
the organisation’s long term strategy whilst at the same time aligning outsourcing 
with the organisation’s strategic plan. The competencies for defining enterprise 
security architecture for an outsourced PKI is discussed and the model chosen was 
SABSA, essentially a five layer model covering all aspects of a business focussed 
methodology for operational security architectures.  
 
The conditions for outsourcing PKI are discussed and a qualitative approach taken 
when looking at all of the different aspects of a PKI implementation, these are fully 
discussed in Section 4.7 of this document. To define the cultural aspects of selecting 
an outsource provider the McKinsey Seven S-Model was selected as it was originally 
developed for the purpose of comprehensively analyzing the culture and behaviour of 
organisations.  
 
Continuity is explained in terms of the ITIL continuity service management model, 
this is a widely adopted and accepted method and this section also outlines an incident 
management process flow along with a post incident review flow. Finally each of the 
disciplines that have been explained in this section is brought together and the 
relevance to the model explained. 
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5. Conclusion 
5.1. Introduction 
The aim of this section is to provide the reader with a summary of results achieved 
from this dissertation, an analysis of the relationship of the realistic results, the 
expected results and how well this dissertation met the stated objectives laid out in the 
dissertation proposal. To finish off there will be a section detailing further work form\ 
this dissertation both on the technical, managerial and outsourcing activities 
associated with PKI.  
5.2. Summary of Outcomes 
In Section Two a basic PKI infrastructure is defined along with the terminology 
relating to it with detailed descriptions of each component. There is a description of 
the cryptographic algorithms, both asymmetric and symmetric involved in a 
functioning PKI along with the security services that can be provided by these 
algorithms. There is a comprehensive key management section detailing with 
standardised models for key management and various methods of key distribution. 
X.509v3 certificates are described in detail including the certificate policy, certificate 
practice statements and various methods of certificate revocation, digital signatures 
are described in a low level of detail to support the certificate section.  
 
In Section Three I have defined the basic principles of Outsourcing. The history of 
outsourcing is explored to determine why organisations outsource and the various 
reasons that are used to measure the benefits of outsourcing such as organisationally 
driven, improvement driven and financially driven reasons. This section looks at 
governance and management of outsourcing and provides a brief description of both 
and how they apply to outsourcing.  
 
In Section Four the concepts surrounding the model where introduced and each of the 
separate disciplines explained individually before being put into context of the model. 
The key concepts looked at in this section were how does the organisation, by the 
introduction of an outsourced PKI, add value to the organisation and how does it help 
the organisation meet their long term strategic aims and objectives. The C’s of the 
model, culture, competencies, conditions, continuity and change are described in 
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terms of existing practices and processes that can be easily adopted within 
organisations if they are not already standard practices. The section finishes with 
taking the concepts that have been discussed and putting them in the context of the 
model.  
5.3. Relating Outcomes to Original Objectives 
The original objectives detailed in the project proposal are listed in Table 19 below. 
 
Main Objective Sub-Objective 
Define the Basic Principles of PKI Introduce the Principles Behind PKI 
Define the Terms Associated with PKI 
Define the Basic Principles of 
Outsourcing 
Introduce the Principles Behind 
Outsourcing 
Define the Terms Associated with 
Outsourcing  
Determine the Business Drivers for 
Outsourcing PKI 
Trusting PKI Outsource Partners 
Address the Managerial PKI 
Deployment Considerations  
Respect to Outsourcing 
Managerial Aspects of Outsourcing 
PKI 
Address Associated Management 
Problems in terms of an Outsourced 
PKI Infrastructure 
Understanding the Technical Issues 
and Complexities of Outsourcing PKI 
Determine the Technical Drivers for 
Outsourcing PKI 
Determine the Core Services PKI offer 
and which can be Outsourced 
Address the Technical PKI 
Deployment Considerations in 
Respect to Outsourcing 
Technical Aspects of Outsourcing 
PKI 
Determine the Enabled Services PKI 
Offer and which can be Outsourced  
 
Table 30: Project Proposal Statement of Objectives 
 
The dissertation has clearly met all of the outcomes of the original objectives set out 
in the project proposal there is a comprehensive introductory section to PKI with 
detailed descriptions from the history and the fundamental principles to the 
terminology, technologies, technical and managerial aspects of PKI. In Section 3 there 
is an introduction to the principles behind outsourcing which details the history of 
 118
outsourcing to the modern day theory of multi-sourcing as well as defining basic 
principles of outsourcing and the definition of the terms associated with outsourcing.  
Section 4 is the proposed model for outsourcing PKI this section brought together all 
of the disciplines described in the previous sections of the dissertation and focused on 
the managerial and technical aspects of PKI.  
 
For the managerial aspects of PKI the outcomes met the objectives because the 
dissertation covers the objectives mentioned in the project proposal such as 
determining the business drivers for outsourcing PKI, building trust in outsource 
partners, addressing deployment considerations and outlining potential management 
problems associated with PKI. The outcomes for the technical aspects mentioned met 
the objectives be detailing technical issues that can arise, determining technical 
drivers, and deployment considerations along with determining core and enabled PKI 
services.  
5.4. Critique - Where the Outcomes as Expected? 
The outcomes were as expected I had planned for the descriptions of PKI and 
Outsourcing would provide the reader with an insight into both disciplines though I 
thought there would be less detail than was actually presented. I expected the PKI 
section to be comprehensive but had to limit the depth of the technical information in 
this section. I expected the Outsourcing section to provide me with the most difficulty 
because of my relative inexperience in this area but the outcome of this section in 
meeting the objectives I have laid down in the project proposal was as I had 
anticipated and from this the reader gains enough information to understand this 
section and how it fits in with the overall theme of the dissertation.  
 
The final model wasn’t as anticipated, initially I aimed to produce a unique model but 
as my research progressed it became obvious that for the model to be accepted 
existing processes and procedures had to be incorporated that is why I looked at the 
SABSA Operational Architecture Model, the Seven S-Model, ITIL Service 
Continuity and the PA Consulting Change Management Model, all of these models 
are already being used and can provide strong support for an Outsourced PKI Model.  
 119
5.5. Future Work from this Dissertation  
There is an enormous amount of future work to come out of this dissertation, as PKI 
becomes more accepted as people become more aware of the technology and the 
business benefits it can bring to an organisation the fear of the unknown will 
evaporate and PKI will be seen as a business enabler. To that end future work can 
involve looking at ways in which PKI technology will be used, it can already be found 
supporting identity and access management systems the question has to be asked is 
how far organisations will want to go in allowing an outsource provider access to 
even more sensitive corporate information.  
 
For each of the sections, Introduction to PKI, Introduction to Outsourcing and the 
Proposed Model there is a vast amount of work that can be pursued, the model can be 
refined and the management processes investigated in greater detail, every aspect of 
the technology can be refined to meet the organisations strategic aims and objectives. 
Most importantly the model can be applied to theoretical or even existing case studies 
to see if its implementation would be effective.  
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System Security Engineering – Capability Model - ISO/IEC 21827 
International Standard • Established by consensus 
• Approved by a recognized body 
• Provides for common and repeated 
use of rules, guidance or 
characteristics of activities and their 
results. 
• Aimed at the achievement of the 
optimum degree of order in a given 
context 
Cost effective and time 
efficient ensuring 
commercial viability 
 The use of this standard can be used to cut 
out trial and error in development and best 
practices. 
Credible This standard is developed by an 
independent body to find best practices for 
system security engineering. 
Advantages 
Core Competencies The model deals with the core 
competencies required for outsourcing 
PKI, namely: 
• Risk 
• Engineering 
• Assurance 
Inherent problems with 
International Standards. 
• Standards implicitly require 
compromise. 
• Compromise can lead to loss of 
interoperability and financial and/or 
commercial viability. 
Partial Implementation due 
to commercial pressure 
Partial compliance with the standard can 
lead to interoperability issues. 
Standards can be 
aggressively undermined 
An organisation can set out to change the 
standard by adapting / extending it beyond 
all recognition, effectively killing the 
standard. 
Specific threats to this 
standard. 
A specific threat to this standard model is 
that if many organisations adopt it, and it is 
subsequently found to have a vulnerability 
then all of organisations will be affected by 
the vulnerability 
Disadvantages
Lack of Scope in 
Assurance process. 
The assurance process in this model deals 
only with repeatability and not security 
functionality or other security assurance 
requirements. 
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SABSA Model 
Usability The model provides an appropriate and 
usable infrastructure for effective 
operational and management processes. 
Inter-Operability The model provides long term 
requirements for interoperability. 
Integration The model allows for integration with 
multiple platforms and applications for 
future growth. 
Supportability The solution the model provides is capable 
of being supported in the environment it 
was designed for.  
Low Cost Development The model supports modular design which 
is capable of being easily integrated into a 
development programme at minimal cost. 
Fast Time to Market The model supports modular design which 
is capable of being easily integrated into a 
development programme with minimal 
delay. 
Scalability of Platforms The model supports the use of a range of 
platforms. 
Scalability of Security 
Level 
The model supports the solution to provide 
a range of cryptographic techniques which 
will be required for the security level of the 
system. 
Re-Usability The model supports the re-use of the 
system in similar situations. 
Advantages 
Lower Operation and 
Administration Costs 
The model allows for the cost impact on 
system operations to be minimised, 
allowing efficient administration. 
Disadvantages Purely a Risk Driven 
Approach 
The model is based on decisions derived 
solely on the analysis of business 
requirements for security. In our opinion 
this scope should be widened to include 
other approaches such as: 
• Data driven approach 
• Scenario driven approach 
• Business goal driven approach 
• Architecture driven approach 
 User Expectations  Users may expect applications to be 
available at all times due to the high 
confidence instilled in an organisation that 
adopts an enterprise security architecture 
 Complex Design and 
Development 
Not only is the design and development 
complex but this model requires architects 
and designers to be able to work together 
to create the system. If there is poor project 
management then this will be an almost 
impossible task.  
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Seven-S Model -  McKinsey & Company 
Adopts a holistic 
perspective 
The inter relationships between key 
components are used to determine the 
overall systems performance 
Adopts organisational 
software 
Organisational software such as mapping 
human behaviour and ergonomics are used 
as part of the systematic approach to 
organisational assessment..  
The Seven S Model is 
simple and easy to 
remember 
The seven S’s were designed so that the 
headings and contents were easy to 
remember.  
Advantages 
User Friendly. The model has a user friendly framework 
and can be used from the earliest stages of 
organisational analysis 
Focuses on internal 
activities 
This model only focuses in activities that 
happen within the organisation and misses 
the opportunity to take into account 
additional activities such as the context in 
which the analysis takes place. 
High level of abstraction There is very little guidance on the actual 
operation of each of the S’s, there is a high 
level description but that’s about it.  
Disadvantages
Doesn’t deal with a variety 
of organisational issues 
As with the focus on internal activities 
there are a whole host of other 
organisational issues that this model should 
take into account but are omitted. 
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ITIL Service continuity 
Aligned with 
organisational strategy 
This model allows for the delivery of 
managed services to meet the business 
requirements of any organisation that 
adopts ITIL.  
Improved quality of service This model is industry best practice, this in 
itself does not provide quality of services 
but if the principles and procedures in ITIL 
are followed then there will be 
improvements in the quality of service. 
Service costs can be 
justified 
As ITIL is widely known and has been 
proven to provide better quality of service 
then justifying the cost of implementation 
should be fairly straight forward. 
Known and common 
procedures. 
The ITIL framework is well known and 
accepted within the business community 
and as such has a level of credibility within 
industry 
Efficient reporting and 
management  
ITIL is focused  on continual process 
improvement to optimise service quality 
Advantages 
Supported by International 
Standards Organisations 
BS15000 and ISO 2000 support the 
concepts of ITIL, both were developed 
after ITIL and are now widely deployed IT 
Service Management Standards. 
ITIL is not a 
comprehensive service 
management system 
Ignoring or being unaware of additional 
requirements can  
Management and staff 
unable to understand the 
principles of  ITIL 
ITIL should be used alongside existing 
management systems and not be 
implemented as the sole system. 
Management effort can be distracted which 
results in the additional costs and 
workloads in implementing an ITIL 
framework and may not produce the 
required results. 
Disadvantages
ITIL requires careful 
maintenance and 
monitoring 
ITIL doesn’t provide very much detail on 
information requirements for its process. A 
lot of time and effort will have to be spent 
on developing an information architecture 
that can support and ITIL installation. 
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PA Consulting - Framework for Outsourcing and Outsourced Enabled Change 
Use of  Business Driver 
Analysis 
Emotional and financial cases for change 
are required if change is to be accepted. 
The used of business driver analysis can be 
used to build an emotional case for change, 
thus, supporting the financial case for 
change. 
Engages changes leaders Identifies and manages relationships 
between the individuals at various levels of 
the business who are responsible for 
change. The model defines how change 
leaders should be approached and managed 
in order to gain a successful result. 
Winning the commitment 
of critical stakeholders 
The model defines how stakeholders are 
identified and managed through robust 
communications planning to build trust and 
understanding. 
Driving the change 
management program 
This model advocates that the program is 
driven “ruthlessly” through the 
organisation as part of a thorough change 
management programme. 
Advantages 
Business outcomes are 
gauged 
This model describes the use of rigorous 
controls to achieve and demonstrate 
business outcomes. This ensures that the 
stakeholders and change leaders are aware 
of milestones in the programme. 
Takes the view of a 
management consultancy 
This model is designed for consultants who 
undertake change management 
programmes for clients, this model may not 
be well suited to all organisations. It will 
largely be down to the culture of the 
organisation if this model is adopted. 
Disadvantages
Lack of credibility  There are numerous change management 
models, some of these include: 
• Beer’s Model 
• Shaw’s Model 
These two models are already well known 
and have credibility.  
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Royal Holloway, University of London 
MSc Information Security 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TO BE COMPLETED BY THE PROJECT CANDIDATE 
 
Name: Christopher McLaughlin 
Contact Email Address(es): christopher.mclaughlin@rhul.ac.uk 
Provisional Title of Project: Outsourcing PKI 
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1. Statement of Objectives 
 
1a. I intend to achieve the following objectives: 
1. Introduce the principles behind PKI 
a. Define the basic principles of PKI 
b. Define the terms associated with PKI 
2. Introduce the principles behind Outsourcing 
a. Define the basic principles of Outsourcing 
b. Define the terms associated with Outsourcing 
3. Managerial Aspects of Outsourcing PKI 
a. Determine the Business drivers for Outsourcing PKI 
b. Trusting PKI Outsource Partners 
i. HMG PKI Initiative 
ii. tScheme 
c. Address the Managerial  PKI deployment considerations in respect to 
Outsourcing 
d. Address associated management problems in terms of an Outsourced 
PKI Infrastructure. 
4. Technical Aspects of Outsourcing PKI 
a. Understand the technical issues and complexities of outsourcing PKI 
b. Determine the technical drivers for Outsourcing PKI 
c. Determine the Core Services PKI offer and which can be outsourced 
d. Address the technical PKI deployment considerations in respect to 
Outsourcing 
e. Determine the Enabled Services PKI offer and which can be 
outsourced 
5. Future work leading on from this dissertation 
a. Define trends in Outsourcing of PKI services 
b. Define changing environments where PKI will become more relevant 
c. Review technological advances that will encourage more widespread 
use of  PKI  
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1.b I have chosen this project for the following reasons: 
 
PKI is a business enabler and with the advent of a network centric society 
organisations have to meet the threats, challenges and opportunities that lay ahead. 
PKI can provide the services that enable business to meet the demands of the 21st 
Century; the technology is available but security professionals that have both the 
technical and business skills are in short demand. I aim to learn about the issues 
involved in both the business and technical aspects of outsourcing PKI as the next 
step on the ladder of my future career. 
 
PKI is an expansive subject providing the core services of Confidentiality, Integrity, 
Authentication and Authorization. By studying PKI outsourcing I aim to consolidate 
my technical knowledge gained on the core and elective modules. I also aim to bring 
in the non-technical aspects of the course into play with looking at the Business and 
Management (both Security and Risk Management), legal aspects as well as standards 
and regulatory bodies that are involved with PKI. 
 
 2. Methods to be used 
 
2a. I aim to use the following methods to achieve the objectives listed in Section 
1, this list is not inclusive of all of the resources that will be used: 
• Standards bodies  
o Objectives to be met by using these standards: Introduction to PKI, 
Technical Aspects of PKI & Future Work: 
? ISO / ITU-T (www.itu.int) 
• X.500 series of standards 
? IETF PKIX (www.ietf.org) 
• Certificate and CRL Profile (RFC 3279, RFC 3280) 
• LDAP V.2  Profile (RFC 2559) 
• LDAP V.2 Schema (RFC 2587) 
• FTP / HTTP Operational Protocols (RFC 
2585 
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• OCSP - Online certificate status protocol 
(RFC 2560) 
• CMP – Certificate Management Protocol 
(RFC 2510) 
• CRMF – Certificate Request Management 
Format (RFC 2511) 
• CP – Certificate Policy (RFC 2527) 
• CPS – Certificate Practice Statement 
Framework (RFC 2527) 
• CMS – Certificate Management messages 
over CMS (RFC 2797) 
• Qualified Certificate Profile (RFC 3039) 
• TSP – Time Stamp Protocol (RFC 3161) 
• S/MIME (RFC 2311 / 2312 / 2630-2634 / 
2459) 
• ISO TC68  
• IPSEC (RFC 2246) 
• TLS (RFC 2246) 
• SPKI (RFC 2692 / 2693) 
• OpenPGP (RFC 2440) 
? ANSI (www.ansi.org) 
• X9 Committee 
? IEEE (www.ieee.ogrg) 
• IEEE P1363 
• Websites 
o Objectives to be met by using these websites: Introduction to PKI, 
Technical Aspects of PKI & Future Work: 
? Understanding X.500: http://sec.cs.kent.ac.uk/x500book/ 
? The PKI Page: http://www.the-pki-page.net/ 
? Open Source PKI Book: 
http://ospkibook.sourceforge.net/docs/OSPKI-2.4.7/OSPKI-
html/ospki-book.htm  
? PKI Forum: www.pkiforum.com 
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? PKI Forum Hong Kong: www.hkpkiforum.org.hk 
? OASIS: www.oasis-open.org/committees/pki/ 
? Federal PKI Steering Committee: 
http://www.cio.gov/fpkisc/ 
? NIST PKI Project:  http://csrc.nist.gov/pki/ 
o Objectives to be met by using these websites: Introduction to 
principles behind Outsourcing & Managerial aspects of 
Outsourcing. 
? HMG PKI: www.hmgpki.gov.uk/ 
? tScheme: www.tscheme.org 
? Webtrust: www.webtrust.org 
? PKI Law: http://www.pkilaw.com/ 
• Books 
o Objectives to be met by using these books: Introduction to PKI, 
Technical Aspects of PKI & Future Work: 
? Alex .W Dent & Chris .J Mitchell, 2005. Users guide to 
Cryptography and Standards. Artec House Inc. 
? Michael .E Whitman & Herbert .J Mattord, 2005. Principles 
of Information Security. Thomsom course Technology of 
Thomson Learning Inc. 
? Ed. Lorrie Faith Cranor & Simson Garfinkel, 2005. 
Security and Usability. Orielly Media Inc. 
? Carlisle Adams &  Steve Lloyd, 2005. Understanding PKI. 
Addison Wiley of Pearson Education Inc. 
? Dieter Gollman, 2004. Computer Security. John Wiley & 
Sons 
? William Stallings, 2003, Network Security Essentials. 
Prentice Hall of Pearson Education Inc. 
? Bruce Schneier, 1996, Applied Cryptography. John Wiley 
& Sons 
? Alfred .J Menezes, Paul .C van Oorschot & Scott .A 
Vanstone, 1997. Handbook of Applied Cryptography. CRC 
Press 
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o Objectives to be met by using these books: Introduction to 
principles behind Outsourcing & Managerial aspects of 
Outsourcing. 
? Ian .J Lloyd, 2004. Information Technology Law. Oxford 
University Press 
? Chris Reed, 2004. Internet Law, Cambridge University 
Press 
? Steve Hedley & Tanya Aplin, 2006. Statutes on IT and E-
commerce. Oxford University Press 
? Maurice .F Greaver II, 1998. Strategic Outsourcing. AMA 
Publications of American Management Association 
International 
? Linda Cohen & Allie Young, 2006. Multi-sourcing. 
Harvard Business School Press 
? Carlisle Adams &  Steve Lloyd, 2005. Understanding PKI. 
Addison Wiley of Pearson Education Inc. 
• Research and White Papers (Selection of Research and White Papers when 
found) 
o Objectives to be met by using Research and White Papers: 
Introduction to PKI, Technical Aspects of PKI,  Introduction to 
principles behind Outsourcing, Managerial aspects of Outsourcing. 
& Future Work: 
• Vendor Websites 
o Objectives to be met by using these Vendor Websites: Introduction 
to PKI, Technical Aspects of PKI, Introduction to principles behind 
Outsourcing, Managerial aspects of Outsourcing. & Future Work: 
? Verisign: www.verisign.com 
? Globalsign: www.globalsign.com 
? Entrust: www.entrust.com 
• Questionnaire (depending on level of response) 
o Objectives to be met by using the Questionnaire: Introduction to 
PKI, Technical Aspects of PKI, Introduction to principles behind 
Outsourcing, Managerial aspects of Outsourcing. & Future Work: 
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2b.  Getting Started 
 
My plan for starting this project is to plan my argument carefully and to break this 
argument down into relevant sections as chapter outlines, the purpose of this will 
allow me to set out a format that any reader of this project will be able to follow and 
understand the validity of any conclusions I make from the material I have researched. 
 
The project will start with a comprehensive introduction into the project and will 
serve the purpose of outlining the general topic of the project, introduction into the 
research I have carried out in the line of preparing the project and to provide a 
preview of what the project will cover and the arguments that I will lay before the 
reader. 
Successive chapters will cover the main headings that I have decided on, namely: 
 
1. Introduction to the principles behind PKI 
2. Introduction to the principles behind Outsourcing 
3. Managerial Aspects of Outsourcing PKI 
4. Technical Aspects of Outsourcing PKI 
5. Future work leading on from this dissertation 
 
I will start each of the chapters by pre-reading material relevant to the chapter and 
analyzing the information obtained from the resources that I have listed. From there I 
will produce draft copies of each of the chapters which I will aim to show my 
arguments for or against any agreeable or conflicting information obtained from the 
resources listed.  
 
I aim to gather as many resources as possible within the months January to July. My 
preparation will include pre-reading of any relevant material including Standards, 
White Papers, Research Papers and Management Reports. I will also try to cultivate 
contacts within Industry that I can use primarily as up to date sources of information 
about the state of PKI in industry and the opportunities for outsourcing services but, if 
possible, use them to review the draft copies of the project as to give an objective 
view on my ongoing efforts.  
 148
 
I also aim to utilize the existing faculty members of the ISG to gain as much 
knowledge from them as possible on the different technical, theoretical and practical 
aspects of the technology behind PKI services and the methods of obtaining trust in 
Outsourcing these services.  
 
After the chapters have been satisfactorily completed then my aim is to tie my 
arguments together with a strong conclusion showing the reader that I have fully 
understood and researched the material and pointing him/her in the direction of 
further work that can be followed on from this project. 
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3a. The work plan 
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3b. Project Plan 
 
My Project Plan (Provided in more detail on the Gantt Chart): 
• Write Project Description Form 
• Get supervisor approval 
• Follow the work plan schedule in terms of milestones 
• Semester Two (January to July) 
o Pre-reading 
o Research 
o Dispatch Questionnaire 
o Cultivate Industry contacts 
• Summer Term ( June to September) 
o Start Write-up 
o Regular meetings with supervisor 
o Final Draft 
o Re-writes if necessary 
o Hand in Dissertation 
4. Additional comments 
The main objectives of this dissertation may change as the project progresses it may 
not be possible to use any information gained through the responses to questionnaires 
as it is difficult to estimate the level of interest that will be achieved. 
 
I aim to cultivate industry contacts as the project progresses to gain a full and varied 
understanding of the issues and complexities surrounding, not only the Outsourcing of 
PKI but also the challenges faced by organisations who maintain an in-house 
capability 
 
 
TO BE COMPLETED BY THE PROJECT SUPERVISOR 
I approve the attached project plan. 
Signed: 
Name: 
Date: 
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Appendix C: PKI Related Standards  
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ANSI X9.24 Retail Financial Services Symmetric Key Management - Part 1: 
Using Symmetric Techniques 
ANSI X9.30 Digital Siganture Algorithm (Based on FIPS 186) 
ANSI X9.31 Reversible DSA (RSA and Rabin-Williams) 
ANSI X9.62 Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm 
FIPS 180-2:2002 SHS (Secure Hash Standard) 
IEEE 1363 Standard Specifications for Public Key Cryptography 
IEEE 1363a Standard Specifications For Public Key Cryptography-
Amendment 1: Additional Techniques  
IETF RFC 4809 Requirements for and IPSec Certificate Management Profile  
IETF RFC 1510 The Kerberos Network Authentication Service 
IETF RFC 2025 Simple Public Key GSS-API Mechanism 
IETF RFC 2246 The Transport Layer Security  Protocol Version 1.0 
IETF RFC 2311 S/MIME Version 2 Message Specification  
IETF RFC 2312 S/MIME Version 2 Certificate Handling  
IETF RFC 2401 Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol 
IETF RFC 2411 IP Security Document Roadmanp 
IETF RFC 2459 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL 
Profile  
IETF RFC 2510 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate 
Management Protocols 
IETF RFC 2511 Internet X.509 Certificate Request Message Format  
IETF RFC 2527 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and 
Certification Practices Framework 
IETF RFC 2528 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Representation of Key 
Excahange Algorithm keys in Internets X.509 Public Key 
Infrastructure Certificates  
IETF RFC 2559 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Operation Protocols 
LDAPv2 
IETF RFC 2560 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate 
Status Protocol 
IETF RFC 2585 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure  Operational Protocols 
FTP and HTTP 
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IETF RFC 2587 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure LDAPv2 Schema 
IETF RFC 2632 S/MIME Version 3 Certificate Handling  
IETF RFC 2633 S/MIME Version 3 Message Specification  
IETF RFC 2797 Certificate Management Messages over CMS 
IETF RFC 2875 Diffie-Hellman Proof of Possession Algorithms   
IETF RFC 3029 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Data Validation and 
Certification Server Protocols 
IETF RFC 3039 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Qualified Certificate 
Profile 
IETF RFC 3161 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Time Stamping 
Protocol  
IETF RFC 3174 SHA-1 Hash Function  
IETF RFC 3279 Algorithms and Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key 
Infrastructure Certificate and CRI Profile    
IETF RFC 3280 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL 
profile   
IETF RFC 3281 An Internet Attribute Certificate Profile for Authorization  
IETF RFC 3628 Policy Requierements for Timestamping Authorities  
IETF RFC 3647 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure  Certificate Policy and 
Certification Practices Framework  
IETF RFC 3709 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Logotypes in X.509 
certificates  
IETF RFC 3739 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Qualified Certificate 
profile  
IETF RFC 3770 Certificate Extensions and Attributes Supporting 
Authentication in PPP and Wireless LAN  
IETF RFC 3779 X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers 
IETF RFC 3820 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Proxy Certificate 
Profile 
IETF RFC 3874 A 224-bit One-way Hash Function SHA-224 
IETF RFC 4043 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Permanent Identifier  
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IETF RFC 4055 Additional Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA cryptography 
for use in Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate 
and Certificate Revocation List  
IETF RFC 4059 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Warranty Certificate 
Extension  
IETF RFC 4158 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certification Path 
Building 
IETF RFC 4210 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate 
Management Protocols 
IETF RFC 4211 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Request 
Message Format 
IETF RFC 4306  Internet Key Exchange Version 2  
IETF RFC 4308  Cryptographic Suites for IPSec  
IETF RFC 4325 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Authority Information 
Access Certificate Revocation List  Extensions  
IETF RFC 4334 Certificate Extensions and Attributes Supporting 
Authentication in PPP and Wireless LAN  
IETF RFC 4346 The Transport Layer Security Protocol Version 1.1 
IETF RFC 4366 The Transport Layer Security Protocol Extensions  
IETF RFC 4386 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Repository Locator 
Service 
IETF RFC 4387 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Operational Protocols: 
Certificate Store Access via HTTP  
IETF RFC 4476 Attribute Certificate Policies Extensions 
IETF RFC 4491 Using GOST R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001 and GOST R 
34.11-94 Algorithms with the Internet X.509 Public Key 
Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile  
IETF RFC 4492 Elliptic Curve Cryptography Cipher Suites for TLS 
IETF RFC 4630 Update to Directory String Processing in the Internet X.509 
Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile  
IETF RFC 4683 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Subject Identification 
Method 
IETF RFC 4806  Online Certificate Status Protocol Extensions to IKEv2 
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ISO/IEC 7498-2:1989 Information processing systems - Open Systems 
Interconnection - Basic Reference Model - Part 2: Security 
Architecture 
ISO/IEC 10118-1:2000 Information technology -- Security techniques -- Hash-
functions -- Part 1: General 
ISO/IEC 10118-2:2000 Information technology -- Security techniques -- Hash-
functions -- Part 2: Hash-functions using an n-bit block cipher 
ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004 Information technology -- Security techniques -- Hash-
functions -- Part 3: Dedicated hash-functions 
ISO/IEC 10118-4:1998 Information technology -- Security techniques -- Hash-
functions -- Part 4: Hash-functions using modular arithmetic 
ISO/IEC 10181-1:1996 Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection -
Security frameworks for open systems: Overview 
ISO/IEC 10181-2:1996 Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection -
Security frameworks for open systems: Authentication 
framework 
ISO/IEC 10181-3:1996 Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection -
Security frameworks for open systems: Access control 
framework 
ISO/IEC 10181-4:1997 Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection -
Security frameworks for open systems: Non-repudiation 
framework - Part 4: 
ISO/IEC 10181-5:1996 Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection -
Security frameworks for open systems: Confidentiality 
framework 
ISO/IEC 10181-6:1996 Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection -
Security frameworks for open systems: Integrity framework 
ISO/IEC 10181-7:1996 Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection -
Security frameworks for open systems: Security audit and 
alarms framework 
ISO/IEC 11770-1:1996 Information technology -- Security techniques -- Key 
management -- Part 1: Framework 
ISO/IEC 11770-2:1996 Information technology -- Security techniques -- Key 
management -- Part 2: Mechanisms using symmetric 
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techniques 
ISO/IEC 11770-3:199 Information technology -- Security techniques -- Key 
management -- Part 3: Mechanisms using asymmetric 
techniques 
ISO/IEC 11770-4:2006 Information technology -- Security techniques -- Key 
management -- Part 4: Mechanisms based on weak secrets 
ISO/IEC 14516:2002 Information technology. Security techniques. Guidelines for the 
use and management of trusted third party services 
ISO/IEC 14888-1:1999 Information technology. Security techniques. Digital signatures 
with appendix, General 
ISO/IEC 14888-2:1999 Information technology. Security techniques. Digital signatures 
with appendix, Identity-based mechanisms 
ISO/IEC 14888-3:2006 Information technology. Security techniques. Digital signatures 
with appendix, Discrete logarithm based mechanisms 
ISO/IEC 15946-1:2002 Information technology -- Security techniques -- Cryptographic 
techniques based on elliptic curves -- Part 1: General 
ISO/IEC 15946-2:2002 Information technology -- Security techniques -- Cryptographic 
techniques based on elliptic curves -- Part 2: Digital signatures 
ISO/IEC 15946-3:2002 Information technology -- Security techniques -- Cryptographic 
techniques based on elliptic curves -- Part 3: Key establishment
ISO/IEC 15946-4:2002 Information technology -- Security techniques -- Cryptographic 
techniques based on elliptic curves -- Part 4: Digital signatures 
giving message recovery 
ISO/IEC 17799:2005 Information technology. Security techniques. Code of practice 
for information security management 
ISO/IEC 18014-1:2002 Information Technology: Security Techniques: Time Stamping 
Services Frameworks  
ISO/IEC 18014-2:2002 Information Technology: Security Techniques: Time Stamping 
Services: Part 2: Mechanisms producing independent tokens  
ISO/IEC 18014-3:2004 Information technology -- Security techniques -- Time-
stamping services -- Part 3: Mechanisms producing linked 
tokens 
ISO/IEC 18033-1:2005 Information technology - Security techniques - Encryption 
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algorithms - Part 1: General 
ISO/IEC 18033-2:2005 Information technology - Security techniques - Encryption 
algorithms - Part 2: Asymmetric ciphers 
ISO/IEC 18033-3:2005 Information technology - Security techniques - Modes of 
operation for an n-bit block cipher 
ISO/IEC 18033-4:2005 Information technology - Security techniques - Encryption 
algorithms - Part 4: Stream ciphers 
ISO/IEC 9796-2:2000 Information technology. Security techniques. Digital signature 
scheme giving message recovery. Integer factorisation based 
mechanisms  
PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Standard 
PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Standard 
PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface Standard 
PKCS #12 Personal Information Exchange Syntax Standard 
PKCS #13 Elliptic Curve Cryptographic Standard 
PKCS #15 Cryptographic Token Information Format Standard 
PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Standard 
PKCS #5 Password Based Cryptographic Standard 
PKCS #6: Extended Certificate Syntax Standard 
PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax Standard 
PKCS #8: Private Key Information Syntax Standard 
PKCS #9: Selected Attribute Types 
 
 
 
